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Physicians are the most difficult health care professional group to retain on active
duty beyond their first obligated tour. A major problem is the disparity between military
and civilian physician income. In fiscal year 1997, the Department of the Navy spent
approximately $135 million in specialty pay on the Navy's 4,000 active duty physicians.
Health care reform has altered the demand for specialty and primary care physicians,
accelerating the movement toward managed care. In this thesis, the authors quantify the
role of the pay differential using a multivariate logistic model and conclude that the
civilian-military pay differential has a significant influence on the probability that a
physician remains in the Navy. Physician personnel and earnings data were gathered
from the Defense Manpower Data Center, the American Association of Medical Colleges,
and the Hay Group. Results indicate that recent shifts in demand have resulted in a
greater sensitivity of retention to pay for primary care physicians. Specialty specific
elasticities can be applied to analyze the expected impact of pay on retention of
representative pay plans. Increases in pay to the civilian median level would substantially
increase retention, but would be costly. This changing military environment in union with
health care reform may be cause for the Navy to re-evaluate its physician pay structure
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More than 4,000 physicians serve on active duty in the medical corps of the Navy. 1
Their primary focus is to be prepared to care for casualties in a major war. In addition to
this obligation, they provide an essential health care benefit to the Department of Defense's
large population of beneficiaries. To guard against any shortages of these professionals, in
1990 congress authorized major increases in pay to all military physicians. 2 But since this
pay authorization was passed in 1990, the health care industry has undergone reform. In
1 992, the health care reform proposal stimulated by President Clinton heightened public
awareness and accelerated the movement toward managed care. The Department of Defense
(DoD) Health Affairs responded by using the Hay Group Physician Compensation Survey
in determining a portion of medical specialty pay for military physicians. Congress should
consider future changes in military medical pay as a result of changes in the size of the armed
forces, the Total Health Care Service Readiness Requirement (THCSRR) system, and in the
civilian health care industry.
In fiscal year 1997, the Department of the Navy spent approximately $130 million
in specialty pay to the Navy's 4,000 active duty physicians. We are concerned whether this
1
"Med-52 (Special Pays) at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery," Phone interview by LT Michael Lane
MSC USN (November 1997).
2 United States Congressional Budget Office, Optionsfor Paying Military Physicians, (Washington: GPO,
1990).
system of specialty pays is adequate to meet the Navy's demand for physicians. The
Congressional intent in initially creating medical special pays was described in these terms:
. . .
Historically, the most difficult officer group to retain on active duty beyond their
first obligated tour is that of the health care professionals and within that group
physicians are, by far, the most difficult subgroup to retain on active duty. A major
cause of the difficulty is the disparity between the income of the health care
professional and his civilian counterpart. It is only in the physician subgroup that
major pay disparities currently exist . . . 3
Associated testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Resources and
Programs before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, included:
One of the reasons we are asking for a bonus plan rather than an increase in basic
compensation, is to permit us to tailor the amounts that we would pay individuals
based upon changing circumstances. It would hardly seem consistent with that goal
to permit people to enter into long-term contracts which might result in our paying
larger bonuses than was necessary. 4
The retention of military physicians has been a topic of much concern over the last
two decades. Previous retention problems have been believed to be the result of a significant
military/civilian pay gap in certain medical specialties. In particular, the managed care
environment has been shifting demand toward the primary care physician. 5 Consequently
the income growth of civilian specialists has been slowing while the income growth of the
primary care physician (general/family practitioner, pediatrician, internal medicine) has been
growing. The Navy has not changed the medical special pay structure since 1980, with the
exception of increasing targeted pay for certain specialists and implementing a multi-year






retention bonus in 1990. However, significant changes in the civilian physician labor market
have occurred since 1990. A reevaluation of the current pay structure, especially the targeted
pay, is warranted since the relationship between pay and retention behavior for Navy
specialist and primary care physicians is changing.
The shift in demand away from certain civilian physician specialties and toward
primary care physicians should decrease the earnings of specialists and increase the earnings
of primary care physicians. This creates a surplus of civilian specialists and therefore easier
to buy off this market or lead to higher Navy specialist retention. Changes in civilian
physician earnings by specialty over time, due to the growth of managed care, are analyzed
in this thesis. To the extent that compensation for Navy physicians does not reflect the
changes in the relative earnings of civilian physicians, the Navy may experience a retention
rate too high in some specialties and too low in others, especially primary care physicians.
The thesis will collect data and estimate a multivariate model ofNavy Physician retention.
The pay elasticities obtained from the multivariate retention model will provide insight on
how the new military-civilian pay differentials, hypothesized to be impacted by managed
care, affect retention ofNavy physician specialists.
B. PURPOSE
In reviewing personnel requirements and authorizations in 1 992 and 1 996, there is
a gap between inventory and authorization for certain specialties. This study observes
whether the civilian/military pay differential has influenced the shortages found in certain
specialties. This thesis replicates a previous study conducted by Dr. Joyce McMahon at the
Center for Naval Analyses in 1989. Her study concluded that the civilian/military pay
3
differential has a significant influence on the probability that a physician leaves the Navy.
She also indicated that increasing physician pay could be an effective policy tool to increase
retention. We felt the need to update this study as it pertains to the rapid changing health
care industry of today.
This study examines the observation that managed care has decreased the demand for
some civilian physician specialties and increased the demand for primary care physicians.
This shift in demand has resulted in a decrease in the earnings growth of some specialists
and an increase in the earnings growth of primary care physicians. Trends over time in
civilian physician earnings by specialty, since the influence of managed care, are analyzed.
To the extent that current compensation patterns for Navy physicians have not kept pace
with the changes in the earnings of civilian physicians, the Navy may experience a retention
rate too high in some specialties and toe iow in others, specifically primary care physicians.
Retention patterns from 1 992 through 1 996 are analyzed for Navy physician specialties to
determine whether they have been affected by the managed care induced demand shift. We
will determine this by quantifying the role of the civilian/military pay differential on
retention. Managed care penetration is absorbed into civilian compensation, thus affecting
civilian earnings. Differences across specialty categories are expected. Navy physician
retention behavior by specialty will be estimated with a multivariate retention model to
evaluate the sensitivity of retention to changes in the relative size of the pay differential,
given that other influences have been controlled for in the model. The resultant pay
elasticities can provide insight on how the new pay differentials, observed to be impacted by
managed care, affect retention of Navy physician specialists.
4
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There are several questions that this review attempts to answer with regard to the
impact of pay on Navy physician retention in a managed care environment. Has the Navy's
physician pay structure followed changes in private sector pay; especially those induced by
the movement toward managed care? How has the growth in managed care changed the
relative demand for civilian physician specialties and resulting pay levels? Has the demand
for primary care physicians increased and what is the effect? What is the opportunity cost
ofNavy and civilian physician compensation? How does the changing pattern of demand
for civilian physician specialists affect retention patterns of Navy specialists? Does the
growth of managed care have an effect on retention ofNavy medical specialists? Does this
effect vary by specialty in a way consistent with the changes in the civilian labor market?
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The thesis conducts a thorough literature review of physician retention models,
medical specialty pay plans, and physicians' pay distributions compared to civilian income.
It reviews changes in physician demand in the civilian market, human capital theory models,
and the managed care index. It also reviews two studies concerning physician retention in
the military, and one study examining the impact of managed care on employment and
compensation of primary care and specialist civilian physicians. The data file used for the
statistical analysis consists of pooled cross-sectional data from of the Health Manpower
Personnel Data System (HMPDS) for 1992-1996. The data were provided by Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The file contains information encompassing five major
areas: medical primary and subspecialties; education data, including intern and residency
5
status; pay information detailing various medical specialty pays; information about current
assignments; personal characteristics and other demographic data. The data set is screened
for selected specialties that are unobligated at the initial and subsequent decision points after
completing their initial obligation. The study determines the physician specialty groupings
based on sample size of each medical specialty from the data and based on variation in the
impact of managed care on different specialties.
A preliminary analysis of the data file involves calculating annual retention rates by
specialty category across time and at different points in time for 1992-1996. Retention rates
among Navy physicians for 1984-1987 are taken from a previous study based on a proposed
specialty grouping. Retention rates among the specialty categories over time (1992-1996)
will be compared with retention rates for 1984-1987 to see if retention has varied by
specialty during health care reform.
The thesis examines retention rates among proposed physician specialty categories'
by including an index of managed care in the retention equations. Retention rates are
compared before and after health care reform began to influence civilian physician earnings.
The pay elasticities are estimated for each specialty category using logistic regression.
These estimates are then compared to those in prior studies, where health care reform was
not an important factor.
This thesis calculates the military/civilian pay ratio ("spot" value), which is the
variable of primary interest. Other control variables are included in the model to isolate the
true independent effect of the pay variable.
From this analysis, the study determines if the narrowing income differentials
between specialists and primary care physicians may require the Navy to reevaluate its pay
structure and examine options for the amount, attached obligation, and recipients of specialty
pays.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides an overview of the managed care environment. It indicates that
the health care reform initiative following President Clinton's efforts in 1992 is dramatically
changing the demand for physicians. This chapter examines the managed care penetration
effect associated with significant changes in physician compensation. The chapter discusses
the overspecialized physician force and how managed care growth will magnify physician
workforce concerns. 6 Specifically, we face an impending oversupply of civilian physician
specialists, and there is a modest need for more generalists. Chapter II introduces the
concept of the managed care penetration index in relation to civilian physician compensation.
The chapter briefly examines evidence from National Residency Match programs that this
growth has opened new positions in primary care, while reducing the number of positions
in selected specialties.
This chapter also discusses Medical Corps current and future requirements in the
context of Department of Defense (DoD) right sizing and managed care trends. The chapter
will focus on special pay programs in an attempt to clarify the alphabet soup of the Medical
Special Pay System. Finally, a review of prior studies is conducted to provide additional
6 Gregory G. Ruhnke, "Physician Supply and the Shifting Paradigm of Medical Student Choice." JAMA
277 .1 (1997): 70.
information regarding the effects of the current and future managed environment on
physician supply and demand.
Chapter III describes the conceptual framework for the specification of the
multivariate model of retention. It provides a description of the following three data sources:
the HMPDS file from DMDC, American Association Medical Colleges (AAMC) physician
compensation survey, and the Hay Group physician compensation survey. Dependent
variable specification is given using the physician's behavior in a given category as the
dependent variable. The chapter also lists the explanatory variables for the model and their
expected effect on the physician retention decision.
Chapter IV delineates the data analysis using the statistical model to determine the
probability that a physician would remain in the Navy, given the explanatory variables. This
chapter examines the authorization and inventory requirements of physicians by specialty,
while examining the "goodness of fit" of the model, elasticity, and marginal effects.
Chapter V provides a summary of research results, recommendations, and areas of
future study. It discusses whether the changing military environment, in conjunction with
the narrowing income differentials between specialists and primary care physicians, may
require the Navy to reevaluate its pay structure.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. OVERVIEW OF THE HEALTH CARE REFORM ENVIRONMENT
This section will provide a literature review and theoretical discussion in four
areas: health care reform initiatives; the shift from specialty to primary care; current and
future medical requirements; and prior studies regarding Navy physician retention.
In 1992, the Clinton administration's health care reform proposal heightened
public awareness of the movement toward managed care. The prime motivator for
reform has been the rapidly accelerating health care costs, which exceeded one trillion
dollars in 1994. 1 The Clinton proposal made a creditable start at solving many of the
issues that hospitals and the American Hospital Association (AHA) have sought to
address, chiefly health care coverage and delivery system restructuring.2 Although
Clinton's plan provided substantial common ground, it also created some battlefields
where improvement was needed. Following the proposals and debate, hospitals had two
main objectives: to make sure the debate stayed on track and that health care reform
happened. 3 In spite of a lack of consensus on reform among Members of Congress and
1 RADM William Rowley, MC, USN, "Health Care Delivery in the 21st Century Trends and
Predictions," (1995), 12.
2 American Hospital Association, "Initial Summary and Analysis of President Clinton's Health Care
Reform Proposal," (September, 1993), 1.
3 Ibid., 4.
the major health care special interest groups, health care reform is proceeding rapidly in
the marketplace. 4
Managed care was seen as the only politically acceptable way to control costs and
simultaneously improve quality. Managed competition was the underlying approach to
the Clinton health care reform proposal. This approach believed that the best way to
deliver health care is through organized networks that functioned as direct care systems
and insurers of care. The managed competition strategists called for a market that
enabled the consumer to choose between competing systems of care based on the price
and objectively measured quality of care under each system. 5
Managed care is defined as any system of delivering health services via a
specialized network of parties who agree to comply with approaches established by a
care-management process. 6 Managed care often involves a defined delivery system of
providers with some form of contractual arrangement with a plan. This would include a
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO), Point of Service (POS), and Preferred
Provider Organizations (PPO).
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO)
HMOs offer prepaid, comprehensive health coverage for both hospital and
physician services. An HMO contracts with health care providers, e.g., physicians,
4 Rowley, 12.
5 George C. Halvorson, Strong Medicine (New York: Random House, 1993), 181.
6 Halvorson, 237.
10
hospitals, and other health professionals and members are required to use participating
providers for all health services. Members are enrolled for a specified period of time.
Point ofService (POS)
POS is also known as an open-ended HMO. POS plans encourage, but do not
require, members to choose a primary care physician. As in traditional HMOs, the
primary care physician acts as a "gatekeeper" when making referrals; plan members may,
however, opt to visit non-network providers at their discretion. Subscribers choosing not
to use the primary care physician must pay higher deductibles and copays than those
using network physicians.
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO)
PPO is a financing arrangement in which a network of providers agree to furnish
services and be paid on a negotiated fee schedule. Enrollees are offered a financial
incentive to use doctors on the preferred list. The services may be furnished at
discounted rates and the insured population may incur out-of-pocket expenses for covered
services received outside the PPO if the outside charge exceeds the PPO payment rate.
Managed care and integrated delivery systems are providing a growing share of
health care services and this growth has dominated recent changes in the medical
marketplace. As of 1995, more than 120 million Americans were enrolled in health
maintenance organizations (HMO's) or preferred provider organizations (PPO's), an
11
increase of from 10 million in 1982. More than 83 percent of patient care physicians had
a managed care contract.7
Evidence suggests that managed care is changing the relative emphasis on
specialty and primary care. A 1994 survey of 24,500 physicians, conducted by the Hay
Group and sponsored by Harvard Community Health Plan and CIGNA Corp., showed
that managed care initiatives have led to a slowing in the growth of physicians' pay and a
shift in the emphasis from specialties to primary care. 8 The sixth annual Hay Physicians'
Total Compensation Survey showed that the growth in physician compensation levels
slowed between 1992 and 1994 across all specialties, and that the compensation for
primary care physicians would be expected to grow at a higher rate than those of
specialists.9
1. Primary Care Emphasis/Managed Care Penetration
Legislation instituted in 1 992 by the Health Care Financing Administration placed
an increased emphasis on primary care physicians. Primary care focuses on health and
prevention rather than illness and cure. Care is continuous and integrated rather than
episodic and comprehensive, which deals only with specific problems. There emphasis is
7 Carol J. Simon, David Dranove, and William D. White, "The Impact of Managed Care on the Physician
Marketplace." Public Health Reports 1 12 (1997): 223.




on patient education. Practitioners practice in teams in a manner which creates process
efficiency.
From a reimbursement standpoint, "fee-for-service" is decreasing as a percentage
of physicians' total revenue. 10 Managed care organizations employ fewer physicians per
patient than "fee-for-service" practices, employ more generalists, and selectively contract
with specialists. 11 Additionally, generalists save money because they tend to order fewer
tests and utilize less expensive treatment modalities for common illness. Managed care
plans have sought to directly control the use of specialists through utilization review and
reliance on the primary care physician market as "gatekeepers." This gatekeeper role is
increasing the opportunity for primary care physicians to manage patients efficiently
across the continuum of care. 12 Consequently, the labor market for family practitioners,
pediatricians and internists has become highly competitive. Economic theory suggests
that changes in the relative demand for physician services will affect compensation and
specialty choices. Adjustments may occur most rapidly in compensation. In the short
run, an increase in the use of primary care services may give rise to a scarcity of primary
care physicians and cause earnings to rise. Existing primary care physicians would be
delivering more services and competing managed care plans would tend to bid up
physicians' fees and compensation. Similarly, a decline in the use of specialty care
10 Robbins, 32.




would generate a surplus of specialists. Compensation levels would decrease as patient
volumes fall. 13 This shift towards managed and capitated 14 systems of care that use fewer
specialists coincides with an abrupt decline in the number of specialist positions
advertised and in the ratio of specialist to generalist positions. 15
Previous studies have examined how managed care penetration affects the
employment and compensation of primary care and specialty physicians. Managed care
penetration can be defined and measured in a number of ways. It is defined and measured
as the proportion of the total lives (population), at a particular time and location, that is
insured under a managed care arrangement or the proportion of those insured who are
insured through managed care. 16 This type of measurement can be difficult because
patient enrollment numbers are available only for HMOs, which constitute only part of
the managed care marketplace. The Simon, Dandrove, and White study using the
Socioeconomic Monitoring System (SMS) and measures managed care penetration based
on the average percentage of physician revenue derived from a managed care contract.
The thesis assumes that the managed care penetration index can be used to
monitor the measurement of opportunity cost (pay differential) between military and
13 Simon, "The Impact of Managed Care," 223.
14 A Capitated system of care refers to a health insurance mechanism in which health care providers are
paid a fixed amount of money each month per insured person to cover services over a period of time,
usually a year.
15
"Marketplace demand down for Specialists, Up for Family Physicians." Science News Update 1996
[JAMA Online]; Available: Http:/www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/sci-news/ 1996/.html; Internet; accessed 5
October 1997.
16 Paul Hogan of Lewin Group.
14
civilian physician compensation. One recent survey concluded that the average growth
of managed care in 15 of America's cities was 21 percent from 1994 to 1995 (Figure l). 17
From a regional viewpoint, managed care penetration (especially HMOs) is rising
everywhere (Table l). 18 Table 1 illustrates that between 1992 and 1995 HMO
enrollment, including POS plans, in the Northeast increased from 24 percent of insured
workers to 49 percent. By market size, while the highest percentages of managed care
reside in communities of over 1 million, the fastest growth of managed care (2 1 percent)




































































Figure 1. HMO enrollment as a percentage of population by city
Source: Managed Care magazine: (1996): On-line.
17
"Houston Leads Major Cities in HMO Penetration Growth." Managed Care magazine 1996. [Online];
Available: Http:/www.managedcaremag.com; accessed 12 Nov 1997.

















Source: Walter A. Zelman, The Changing Health Care Marketplace., (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 1996), 18.
Note: Employer-provided insurance only
InterStudy Publications analyzed the managed care market penetration in 301
metropolitan areas (defined by the census bureau). Their analysis describes how sixty-
nine cities claim managed care penetration, in its strict definition, of greater than 25
percent; while smaller health care markets show penetration of 16 percent.20 Using
penetration data from InterStudy Publications, Figure 2 provides a state-by-state
comparison of managed care penetration for 1996. Managed care penetration is discussed
in more detail in Simon, Dranove, and White's study found in the "Review of Previous
Studies" section of this chapter.
20
"Two out of Three HMO Members Live in Large Metropolitan Area" Managed Care Magazine




Figure 2. HMO enrollment as a percentage of total state population in 1996
Source: Managed Care magazine: Managed Care Outlook (December 1996): On-line.
2. Physician Compensation Growth
The disproportionate fees paid to specialists are a problem in all areas of U.S.
health care. Historically, this gave specialty providers an incentive, because of higher
reimbursement, to provide unnecessary procedures and encouraged a disproportionate
number of medical students to enter into nonprimary-care specialties. 21 The federal
government identified the excessive variance in income, among specialist physicians, and
revised the payment approach. In 1992, the Health Care Financing Administration
instituted a modified pay schedule process for Medicare called the resource based relative
21 Halvorson, 38.
17
value scale (RBRVS).22 The goal of this new process was to reduce specialty incomes
and to increase primary-care incomes. This new payment process coupled with a
shortage of primary care doctors and a surplus of expensive specialists has closed the
compensation gap between generalists and specialists. The following table shows the
significant growth in compensation for primary care physicians during the period 1992
through 1994. It also highlights the slow growth of compensation for "procedure-based
specialties."23 Annual compensation for the procedure-based specialties grew around one
percent whereas compensation for primary care specialties grew between 14 and 26
percent.
Table 2. Compensation Trends Across Specialties


















































Source: Morley M Robbins and Richard C . Loudermilk, "Lining Up Their Shots" Hospitals & Health
Networks (May 1994), 32.




The growth trend among the all specialists during the period of 1992 to 1994 is more
complex than what the table describes. A more detailed examination of table 2 reveals
clusters of trends among the four groups of specialists. The reduced rate of increase
shown above for procedure based specialties and the high rate of growth in primary care
specialties indicate that the health care market is redefining their value.
3. Overspecialized Physician Force
Several reports have examined the potential oversupply of Hospital and
Procedure-Based physicians. 24 Currently about 34 percent of America's physicians are
primary care generalists (family practitioners, internists, and pediatricians), whereas in
Canada and other Western countries about 70 percent are generalists.25 Most physician
analysts agree that, despite a moderate need for primary care, we face an impending
oversupply of physicians. 26 In 1995, there were 50 to 300 percent more physicians in
most specialties than the number required to care for all Americans using the staffing
standards of large HMOs.27 The continued growth in managed care may magnify the
physician surplus and the imbalance in the primary care-to-specialist identified in the
24 Ruhnke, 70.





1992 Council On Graduate Medical Education (COGME) third report. 28 In the sixth
COGME report of 1995, the council predicted a surplus of 1 15,000 specialists by the year
2000. Overspecialization during the 1980s propelled health care costs, while intensifying
the problem of a physician-induced demand.
A study by Simon, Dranove, and White (1997) on the impact of managed care on
the physician workplace found that primary care incomes grew 4.78 percent annually in
states with high managed care growth and 1 .2 percent where there was slow growth. The
incomes of radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists only rose 0.14 percent in
states with high managed care growth compared to 4.14 percent where growth was
slow.29 Data gathered from HMOs on the projected increase in managed care plans
through the end of the decade lend credit to the expectation that managed care will
increase and, with that increase, the relative demand for generalists will rise.
Additionally, according to a JAMA Report (1997) government policies funding
graduate medical education (GME) without regard for the changing dynamics of
physician employment has facilitated an overspecialized physician workforce.
Heightening that dilemma is a possible "cobweb effect" where the medical students'
choice of specialty has not reflected the market dynamics of generalist and specialist
28 The Council on Graduate Medical Education was authorized by congress in 1986 to provide an ongoing
assessment of physician workforce trends and to recommend appropriate federal and private sector efforts
to address identified needs. Legislation calls for COGME to serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Senate Committees on Labor and Human
Resources, and the House of Representatives Committee on Commerce.
29 Simon, "The Impact of Managed Care," 222.
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demand, as would be expected in an efficiently functioning labor market, because
medical students make decisions regarding specialty selection based on lagged earning
rather than expected future earnings. Resident input was the primary mechanism by
which physician employment information was communicated to medical students.
However, recent data suggests medical students are now incorporating future market
conditions into their choice of specialty and are responding to the shifting job
opportunities for generalists relative to specialists. 30
4. National Residency Match Programs
Evidence from the National Residency Match Programs (NRMP) indicates that
since 1989, residency programs have opened new positions in primary care and that
growing numbers of new physicians are choosing to fill them. At the same time
programs are reducing the number of positions in selected specialist positions. Between
1989 and 1995 the number of family practice and pediatric residency positions increased
by 10.8 percent, and the number filled rose by 32 percent. There was modest evidence of
an increase in the attractiveness of surgical specialty training in that the proportion of
residency positions filled remained relatively stable. The number of radiology,
anesthesiology, and pathology (RAP) positions increased by 14 percent, peaking in 1993,
but the number filled decreased by more than 1 5 percent. Virtually the entire decline was
accounted for by positions in anesthesiology. 31 Figure 3 shows that the percentage of
30 Louis Goodman, "Managed Care's Role in Shaping Physician Job Market." JAMA 277. 1 (1997): 72.
31 Simon, "The Impact of Managed Care," 229.
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medical school graduates planning a career in primary care dropped from 34.1 percent in
1983 to a low of 14.6 percent in 1992. But since then, the numbers have turned around in
that the choice of general medicine rose to 27.6 percent in 1995. 32
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Figure 3 . Percentage of medical school graduates interested in General Medicine
Source: "Facts, Applicants, Matriculants and Graduates 1988-1994" Association of American Medical
Colleges.
Note: General medicine consists of family practice, general internal medicine and general pediatrics.
B. MILITARY PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Reductions in the size of the armed forces, coupled with a greater focus on
satisfying peacetime medical needs could decrease the military's need for uniformed
physicians. A Congressional Budget Office study in 1990 found that although there had
32 New York Times. "Specialty or General Practice: Young Doctors Change Paths, " Oct 16 1995, B2.
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been several years of declining retention, approximately 740 more physicians served on
active duty in the medical work force in 1988 than in 1982, there was a 9 percent
increase. 33 The 1990 Congressional Budget Office study on alternative plans for paying
physicians considered the following illustration: a one-third reduction in the military to
1 .4 million active-duty personnel. 34 This decline would reduce the total population that is
served by the military by one-fifth, to 6.6 million. 35 Based on staffing patterns in large
civilian health maintenance organizations, the military would need approximately 8,320
physicians to serve the health care needs of that reduced population size, and the specialty
mix would need to shift away from surgery. 36 The military readiness platform for the
medical department determines the roles and requirements for the wartime and peace time
mission. As the reserves assume a larger role in maintaining medical readiness for war,
the active components will need fewer physicians, not more. These changes provide
additional reasons to look at the current pay structure in light of the changing civilian
health care environment.
1. Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement (THCSRR)
Since the end of the cold war, the U.S. Navy has undergone a multitude of
changes, THCSRR was driven by the "733 study." Congress directed this two-year





study in section 733 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 37 This j s }3est pU^ jn the following quotation:
As budgetary and legislative pressures have continued to 'right
size' the Navy. Navy medicine responded by developing the Total Health
Care Support Readiness Requirement (THCSRR) model. This model
allows Navy medicine to accurately determine and project its active duty
manpower readiness requirements to the subspecialty level based on the
two readiness missions of Navy medicine: Wartime and Day-to-Day
Operational support to the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force (FMF).38
a. Navy Medicine's Missions
The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a medical establishment for
three separate but united reasons. The most important reason is to meet wartime demands
for medical care. The second reason is to preserve the medical readiness of military
personnel in peacetime so they can mobilize in the event of a conflict or other
requirements. The third reason is to provide the health care promised to approximately
three million beneficiaries. In order to understand how Navy medicine defines its
manpower readiness requirements, an understanding of its three missions is necessary:
Wartime, Day-to-Day Operational Support, and the Peacetime Health Benefit.
(1) Wartime Mission: "To meet wartime demands for
medical care in a scenario defined by two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts
37 William J. Lynn, "Section 733 Study of the Military Medical Care System," Statement presented
before the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel Committee on Armed Services United States
House of Representatives 103d Congress," Washington D.C., 19 April, 1994.
38 LT T.H. Weber
, "The THCSRR Model: Determining Navy Medicines' Readiness Manpower
Requirements" Navy Medicine, (September-October 1994): 19.
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(MRCs)."39 This mission encompasses the following: mobilizing two hospital ships,
supporting the fleet, supporting the Fleet Marine Force, numerous fleet hospitals, and
maintaining outside the continental United States (OCONUS) Medical Treatment
Facilities (MTFs) and Dental Treatment Facilities (DTFs).
(2) Day-to-Day Operational (DDO) Support Mission: This
mission is supported by two elements, the Peacetime Operational Force and the CONUS
Rotational Base. The Peacetime Operational Force is defined as the Fleet, Fleet Marine
Force, OCONUS MTFs/DTFs and isolated CONUS locations (ICONUS). This mission
is also supported by a CONUS RB, which is the number of shore billets required to
support the Peacetime Operational Force. One of the most influential factors in the DDO
component is the Rotational Base for the Peacetime Operational Force. The Rotational
Base is designed to provide a pool of skilled and trained active duty medical personnel to
relieve those serving overseas, with the fleet and Fleet Marine Force, and in isolated
CONUS duty stations. While awaiting assignment to Peacetime Operational Force
billets, these personnel serve in CONUS hospitals and clinics providing health care
services to active duty members and the beneficiary population 40
(3) Peacetime Health Benefit Mission: In 1997, the Navy
provided health care to approximately 700,000 active duty Navy and Marine Corps
members and 2.6 million active duty, retired and family member beneficiaries via the
39 Lynn, 3.
40 K. Copenhaver, "Requirement Model and Programing Costs," (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, 1994), 74.
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direct care system or CHAMPUS (currently TRICARE). 41 The first two missions, the
Wartime and DDO missions, define the number of active duty Navy personnel. Only
because of the requirement number of Navy personnel needed to support these first two
missions, that this third mission of providing medical and dental care in CONUS MTFs
and DTFs can be accomplished.
b. THCSRR Model Background
The driving force for the THCSRR model came from the economic and
legislative pressures that were placed on the Department of Defense in 1 99 1 to downsize
the total force structure. Navy medicine began feeling these pressures when a study of
the Medical Health Services System (MHSS) was conducted by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation. This two-part study, titled the
"733 Study," "determined the total medical care requirements needed to support active
duty services during a post cold-war time scenario."42
The two parts of the "733 study" were the Wartime and Peacetime
requirements. The "733 study" determined the number of Navy medical personnel
necessary to support Theater Workload (TW) and Force Structure (FS) requirements.
These include fleet hospitals, hospital ships, echelon one and two care, OCONUS
41 The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Homepage; Available:
Http:/www. supportl.med.navy.mil/bumed/; Internet; accessed January 1998.
42 Lynn, 2-4.
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Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities, Research and Development, trainers, and
headquarters staff (e.g., BUMED, CINC).43
The study suggested that since the end of the cold war the number of
active duty Navy personnel has decreased, and implied that medical manpower
requirements need to decrease while maintaining the two MRC scenarios. The "733
study" conjectured that only half of the active-duty physicians projected to be available in
fiscal year 1999 would be required to meet wartime demands. Although the study went
on to assess the peacetime benefit, the Surgeon General of the Navy, Vice Admiral Hagen
asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to conduct a study to examine the manpower
requirements unique to Navy medicine to meet the day-to-day operational mission.44
Upon completion of the CNA study in 1 992, VADM Hagen tasked his
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) FY96 Medical Task Force to develop a single
manpower readiness requirement model that incorporated both the "733 Study" and CNA
studies. This model is now known as the Total Health Care Support Readiness
Requirement or THCSRR. "THCSRR calculates the minimum active duty medical end
strength required to meet both parts of the readiness mission, namely, wartime
requirements and the day-to-day operational health care requirement . . ,."45
43 Copenhaver, 43.
44 Weber, 20.
45 CDR J. A. Bashford, "A Navy Medical Department Overview for the DON QOL Master Plan" Navy
Medicine (February 1 996), 7.
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c. Future of Navy Medicine under THCSRR
With THCSRR, Navy medicine has defined the most efficient and
effective mix of manpower readiness requirements. However, implementation of these
requirements will be a challenge in an environment of competing demands. THCSRR
has established a stable floor for the minimum number of active duty in all medical
communities. Due to the intense budget environment, there is a high probability that any
community whose billet authorization exceeds its THCSRR requirement will be reduced
to its THCSRR floor.46 Navy medicine is moving toward total implementation of
THCSRR within the next five years. Several studies are presently being conducted to
determine the most cost efficient make-or-buy solution (i.e. outsourcing) to providing
health care in the peacetime environment.47 That is to say, if providing health care with
active duty medical personnel is less expensive than purchasing the Navy's health care,
than the number of active duty medical personnel will be maintained. If purchasing
civilian health care is less expensive, than military medical personnel cuts will most
likely be made. Any cuts will be those personnel in excess ofTHCSRR requirements.
DoD's requirement for physicians has been modified as a result of the end
of the Cold War scenario, the advent of regional threats, and the pervasive downsizing of
the military in response to budget deficits. Additionally, DoD had dramatically altered its
approach to providing medical care to military beneficiaries during peacetime. DoD
46 Weber, 22.
47 Captain (sel) Penny Turner MSC USN, "Medical Resources, Plans, and Policy Division (N931C2C)
CNO," Email and phone interview by LT Michael Lane MSC USN, (September 1997).
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started relying more extensively on civilian providers to deliver much of that care.
Although the department is currently reevaluating its projected demand for physicians, it
has not reached final decisions about the number of physicians needed nor the optimal
length of time that physicians should serve.48
2. Future Civilian Physician Requirements
Following a brief discussion of the 1992 Council on Graduate Medical Education
(COGME) third report and its implications, this section provides a forecast of civilian
physician demand using an overview of two physician supply and demand projections.
The first is the 1996 COGME eighth report titled Patient Care Physician Supply and
Requirements and the other is from Managed Care Magazine on-line which uses data
from the Sachs Group located in Evanston, Illinois.
In the rush to balance the proportion of primary care physicians and specialists,
the 1992 COGME third report described the concept of the "1 10:50/50 recommendation"
or "50% solution."49 This recommended the following:
... the number of physicians entering residency be reduced from 140% to
1 10% of the number of graduates of allopathic and osteopathic medical
schools in the United States in 1993 and that the percentage of those
graduates who complete training and enter practice as generalists should
be increased from the current level of 30% to 50%. 50
48 General Accounting Office
,
Military Physicians: DOD's Medical School and Scholarship Program,
GAG7HEHS-95-244 (Washington D. C, September 1995).
49 The COGME Third Report was titled: Improving Access to Health Care through Physician Workforce
Reform: Directionsfor the 21st Century.
50 COGME Eighth Report: Patient Care Physician Supply and Requirements: Testing COGME
Recommendations, (Rockville, Maryland DHHS November 1996): 1.
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The implications of these suggestions are enormous. This implies that first year
residency positions in the United States would be reduced from 25,000 to approximately
19,600, a 22 percent decrease. 51 The number of physicians entering specialties would
drop 44 percent, while the number of generalists would increase by one-third.52 The
president's "Health Security Act" calls for this goal to be achieved among resident
physicians by the year 2003
.
53
In the first overview, the COGME eighth report utilizes five approaches to
project future physician requirements using two different methodologies. One is an
adjusted needs-based methodology, while the other four are demand-based. The demand-
based methods make assumptions about patterns of health delivery and an individual's
ability to pay for services. They then project future demand based on current utilization
rates, projected increases in population size, and specific assumptions about the delivery
system.54 Table 3 shows the physician requirements in the year 2000 and the year 2020
for each of the five requirement methods as well as the projected supply of generalists
and specialists.55 The last line in the table calculates the projected surplus or shortage.
Despite different assumptions in regard to physician requirement projections, all
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 R.A. Cooper, "Seeking Balanced Physician Workforce for the 21st Century." JAMA 272 (1997): 680.
54 COGME Eighth Report, 8.
55 Ibid., 11.
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scenarios project 60-80 generalists per 100,000 population in the early 21st century
(Figure 4). 56 As illustrated in figure 4, the projected supply lies in the lower portion of
COGME's requirement band (shaded area in figure). COGME concludes that future
specialist requirements in the early 21st century will be approximately 85-105 specialists
per 100,000 population. Figure 5 illustrates that the projected supply of specialists,
excluding residents, will be 40 percent above upper levels of the requirement band and 54
percent above the requirement band if residents were included. 57 Figures 6 and 7 provide
a comparison of the specialty mix alternatives when the supply of total residents is
reduced to 110 percent of the United States Medical Graduates.58 This methodology
suggests that both a reduction in trainees to at least 110 percent of United States Medical
Graduates as well as an increase in proportion of generalists to 50 percent will best bring
generalists and specialist population ratios toward the upper limits of their respective
requirement ranges. 59
56 Ibid., 8.




Table 3. Generalist and Specialist Patient Care Requirements and Forecasted Supply
Under Current Trends: Physicians per 100,000 Population
Year 2000 Year 2020
Source Generalist Specialist Total Generalist Specialist Total
BHPr Managed Care Scenario 1 77 96 173
Weiner2 59 82 141
GMENAC3-4 72 106 178
BHPr Fee-for-Service Scenario 69 138 207
Utilization-based^










Requirements Range 59-77 82-138 141-207 75-81 92-149 173-225
Projected Supply 63 140 203 66 148 214
Surplus (+) / Shortage (-) +4/-14 +58/+2 +62/-4 -9/-15 +41/-11
1. Gamliel S. Polizer R, Rivo M, Mullan F. "Managed Care
on the March: Will the Physician Workforce Meet the
Challenge?" Health affairs, Summer 1995.
2. Weiner JP. "Forecasting the Effects of Health Care
Reform on U.S. Physician Workforce Requirements:
Evidence from HMO Staffing Patterns". JAMA 1994; 272
(3): 222-230.
3. Bowman, M.A, Et al. "Estimates of Physician
Requirements for 1990 for the Specialties of Neurology,
Anesthesiology, Nuclear Medicine, Pathology, Physical
Medicine and Rehabilitation, and Radiology: A Further.
Application of the GMENAC Methodology". JAMA 250;
1983.
4. "Summary Report of the Graduate Medical Education
National Advisory Committee". September 1980, Vol 1, US
DHHS pub no. (HRA) 81-651. Rockville, MD: Office of
Graduate Medical Education, HRSA, April 1981.
5. "Refinements to BHPr Requirements Forecasting
Models", Vol II: Data and Methology. Rockville, MD:
BHPr, HRSA, April 1993.
6. Cooper R. "Seeking a Balanced Physician Workforce for
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Figure 4. Requirements for Generalist Physicians: Five Models and Analyses
Source: Council on Graduate Medical Education. Eighth Report: Patient Care Physician Supply and
Requirements: Testing COGME Recommendations, (Rockville, Maryland: DHHS, November 1996): 8.
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Requirements For Specialist Physicians
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Figure 5. Requirements for Specialist Physicians: Five Models and Analyses
Source: Council on Graduate Medical Education. Eighth Report: Patient Care Physician Supply and
Requirements: Testing COGME Recommendations, (Rockville, Maryland: DHHS, November 1996): 9.
Generalist Physician Supply Under Alternative
Specialty Mix Scenarios When Physician Output is Reduced to 110%
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Figure 6. Generalist Physician Supply Under Alternative Specialty Mix
Source: Council on Graduate Medical Education. Eighth Report: Patient Care Physician Supply and
Requirements: Testing COGME Recommendations, (Rockville, Maryland: DHHS, November 1996): 16.
33
Specialist Physician Supply Under Alternative
Specialty Mix Scenarios When Physician Output is Reduced to 110%
of United States Medical Graduates
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Figure 7. Specialist Physician Supply Under Alternative Specialty Mix
Source: Council on Graduate Medical Education. Eighth Report: Patient Care Physician Supply and
Requirements: Testing COGME Recommendations, (Rockville, Maryland: DHHS, November 1996): 16.
The eighth COGME report did not provide recommendations as to the number of
ensuing years from today that GME programs should follow this guideline. In the midst
of a physician surplus, the matter of precision in "requirement ranges" may be less
pertinent than distinguishing where the system has sufficient elasticity to absorb
additional physicians productively. Currently, the system has the capacity to absorb
many additional generalists whereas the capacity to absorb specialists is declining. 60
There is a long-term need to ensure the balance in the physician workforce in the years
between 2015 and 2030, the period that will be most affected by current policy. 61
60 Ibid., 18.
61 Cooper, "Seeking a Balanced Physician Workforce " 686.
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Figure 8 illustrates that unmanaged fee-for-service health plans currently (1997) make up
only 5 percent of US group insurance, while managed fee-for-service is projected to
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Figure 8. Managed care trends
Source: Council on Graduate Medical Education. Sixth Report: Managed Care: Implications for the
Physician workforce and Medical Education, (Rockville, Maryland: DHHS; September 1995): 10.
Note: The group projects physician demand from the perspective of a nation's health care completely
controlled by managed care. This is consistent with the apparent unstoppable evolution and variable growth
that managed care is experiencing throughout the United States.
In Figure 9, the Sachs Group projects demand for primary care doctors in the year
2000. Their projections show that in each of the four regions of the country, more





Managed care's influence means that within
three years, the nation will need 34,000 more
primary care doctors, but 37,000 fewer
specialists, according to one survey. The
Northeast- with hospital-heavy metropolitan
centers such as Boston, New York and
Philadelphia-- would have greater




















































Figure 9. Demand for physicians in the year 2000










C. MEDICAL SPECIAL PAY SYSTEM
The Report of the Seventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
classifies medical special pay as career incentive pay or skill incentive pay. The long
term career incentive pays are designed to close the gap between military pay for
specialists and the low end of comparable civilian pay scales. The permanent nature of
the pay and the predictability it provides recipients does not require the Services and
Congress to make immediate adjustments in the face of retention problems. Skill
incentive pays on the other hand are short-term bonuses, and must be responsive to
cyclical conditions in civilian labor markets affecting retention. Retention will suffer, or
unnecessary payments will be made, to the degree that problems are not identified early
and bonus amounts and obligation amounts have not been justified.62
Aside from the regular military compensation (RMC) received by all military
officers, military physicians also receive medical special pay. Apart from a short-lived,
experiment with special pay for "surgeons and surgeons' mate," there was no special pay
program for health professional before 1947.63 In 1980, the entire special pay program
for physicians was substantially changed when Congress adopted the Uniformed Services
Health Professionals Pay Act of 1980, making the entitlements permanent subject to
future Congressional withdrawal. This act defines the present system and created four
types of pay: Career incentive pays: (a) variable special pay (VSP), (b) board-certified
pay (BCP), and Skill incentive pays: (c) additional special pay (ASP), and (d) incentive
62 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. The Report ofthe Seventh Quadrennial Review ofMilitary
Compensation (QRMC). (Washington: GPO 1992).
63 Department of Defense, Military Compensation Background Papers. (Washington: GPO 1987).
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special pay (ISP). Career incentive pays are paid monthly on a long-term basis and no
service obligations are attached. Skill incentive pays are annual bonuses and the
recipients incur a service obligation. Whereas career incentive pay is characterized as
stable and predictable, skill incentive pay is characterized as short-term and more
flexible. All physicians regardless of specialty receive VSP, BCP, and ASP. ISP is a
targeted pay that is awarded to address retention difficulties and shortages in critical
specialties. Between 1980 and 1988, these special pays lost about one-third of their value
due to inflation.64
Skill Incentive Pays - ISP is an annual bonus paid to physicians 0-6 and below.
ISP varies by specialty and does not exceed $36,000 a year. Physicians that accept ISP
must agree to remain on active duty for one additional year. Any physician not
undergoing internship or initial residency training who agrees to remain on active duty
for one year can receive the ASP, a $15,000 annual bonus. In 1989, Congress added a
new type of targeted pay called the medical officer retention bonus (MORB), now called
the Multiyear Special Pay (MSP). MSP is classified as a skill incentive pay and is
awarded to physicians who agree to remain on active duty for 2, 3, or 4 years after
completion of any other service obligation. The duration of the agreement determines
the amount payable. Annual amounts range from $2,000 to $14,000 and are payable
upon acceptance of the agreement and on the anniversary of the agreement. To qualify
64 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Seventh Quadrennial Review.
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the physician must also be 0-6 or below and have at least eight years of creditable
service. 65
Career Incentive Pays - VSP is an entitlement for physicians serving on active
duty for periods of at least one year. The annual rates range between $ 1 ,200 and $ 1 2,000
for physicians with six but less than eight years of credible service. After the physician
has reach eight years of service, this pay benefit is eliminated based on the hypothesis
that expected retirement benefits and other types of special payments will serve as greater
incentives for physicians to stay on active duty. BCP is an entitlement for physicians
who obtain board certification and annual rates range from $2,500 to $6,000 depending
on years of credible service. However, physicians with less then 10 years of service
receive $2,500 annually and physicians with 18 years of service or more receive $6,000
annually. 66 MSP and ISP rates are established by the tri-service Flag Officer Review
Board. Each year under the auspices of the OASD(HA), the Hay Group conducts a study
of civilian physician salaries by specialty. This data is analyzed and used as a basis to
determine amounts of MSP and ISP for each military specialty. Table 4 provides a
breakdown of the different specialty pays, the number of recipients, and the amount of
special pay for fiscal years 1992 to 1997.
A recent GAO report stated that, in general, military physicians were eligible for




Services (HHS) physicians.67 However, the average military physician is paid 23 percent
less than HHS physicians. The report stated that the average military special pay amount
for physicians was $35,190, with a maximum of $79,500 per year. This report went on
to say that in comparing military and private physician pay, physicians in general surgery,
internal medicine, psychiatry, and family practice were generally paid more in the private
sector. In the specialty comparison, thoracic surgery, radiology and anesthesiology,
civilian physicians were paid considerably more, based on information from their studies.
Table 4. Special Pay Comparison for Fiscal Years 1992 to 1997
FY 92 FY 93 FY 94
VSP
Number iAmount* Number iAmount Number iAmount
4,348 33,900 4,364 33,617 4,336 33,505
ASP 3,297 49,455 3,290 49,350 3,207 48,105
BCP 1,813 6,593 1,899 6,933 1,914 6,998
ISP 1,368 17,810 1,870 29,957 1,932 33,010
MORB 569 6,766 92 1,100
MSP 674 4,870 776 8,872 953 10,083
Total 12,069 $119,394 12,291 $129,829 12,342 $131,701
FY 95 FY 96 FY 97
VSP
Number iAmount Number iAmount Number iAmount
4,219 32,624 4,068 31,506 4,039 30,956
ASP 3,104 46,567 3,074 46,110 3,052 46,117
BCP 1,835 6,931 1,847 7,075 1,859 7,311
ISP 1,985 34,806 2,007 37,211 2,086 39,594
MORB
MSP 986 10,397 986 10,450 997 10,622
Total 12,129 $131,325 11,982 $132,352 12,033 $134,600
Source: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Med-52 (Special Pays), (Washington, D. C, November 1997.)
67 Pay &Benefits: Comparative Analyses of Federal Physicians' Compensation, GGD-97-170
(Washington D.C. 15 September 1997).
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The GAO report also looked at the following military non-wage compensation:
medical care for the member and their family, disability insurance, housing,
commissaries/exchanges, and recreational facilities. Additionally, military personnel
(physicians) have the option of declaring a state residence regardless of their duty station.
This benefit provides a significant tax advantage since some states have no income tax.
D. REVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES ON PHYSICIAN PAY AND RETENTION
1. Simon, Dranove, and White
Their study examined the impact of managed care on the employment and
compensation of primary care and specialty physicians. The rates of managed care
growth and levels of managed care penetration in the marketplace vary across
geographical areas. Their study examined the relationship between changes in managed
care penetration at the state level between 1989 and 1993 and the corresponding rates of
growth in primary care and specialist physician's incomes. Second, they looked at the
relationship between changes in managed care penetration and changes in the number of
primary care and specialty physicians per capita for the same period. Third, they
considered national trends in graduating U.S. medical school seniors' matches with
specialty programs for the period 1989-1995.68
Their study used data from the American Medical Association's (AMA)
Socioeconomic Monitoring System (SMS) surveys to measure physicians' incomes and
involvement in managed care over the period 1985-1993. The SMS is designed to be
representative of the patient-care physician population. It has a 60-70 percent response
68 Simon, "The Impact of Managed Care" 222.
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rate. The number of respondents is approximately 4,000 annually, corresponding to 1
percent of physicians. The sample of the SMS is drawn from the AMA Masterfile. The
AMA Masterfile contains data on the specialty, location, and practice status of all known
physicians in the U.S. Responses were weighted for non-response bias using weights
developed by the AMA. Data were also drawn from the AMA Masterfile and U.S.
Census for the years 1989-1993 to examine changes in physician-to-population ratios.
Data from the National Residency Matching Program were used to examine specialty
choices of medical school graduates.
The SMS data were used to construct a measure of managed care penetration at
the state level based on the average percentage of physician revenue derived from a
managed care contract. Then the measure of managed care penetration was used to
develop an indicator of managed care growth in states by calculating the percentage
change in managed care penetration in each state between 1985 and 1993. The states
were ranked based on their percentage change in managed care penetration and assigned
to quartiles. 69
Physician Income was defined as net practice income after expenses and before
taxes. The annualized rates of inflation-adjusted income growth were computed using the
median income by specialty category and state in 1985 and 1993, and the Consumer Price
Index was used to adjust the median income for inflation. The annualized rate of change
in physician median income between 1985 and 1993, by specialty category and state, was
69 Ibid., 224.
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calculated and used as the dependent variable in three separate regression equations, one
for each specialty group considered.70
The study selected three specialty categories to capture the maximum variation in
the impact of managed care on different types of physicians: Primary care physicians;
medical and surgical subspecialists; and "RAPs" (radiologist, anesthesiologist,
pathologist). These categories are also adopted in this thesis for the analysis of physician
retention and are further described later.
Simon, Dranove, and White specified a multivariate regression model to look at
the effect of managed care penetration on annualized rates of growth in the median
income of primary care and specialist physicians. States were assigned dummy variables
based on their managed care quartile. Other independent variables were included to
control for differences in the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of each
state's population. These characteristics included: state birth rates, percentage of
population less than five, percentage of population more than 65, percentage of
population nonwhite, percentage of population urban, and per-capita income. The
annualized rate of change during the 1985 - 1993 period also was computed for each of
the independent variables. Separate regressions were performed for each specialty group.
The results found a significant effect of the growth in managed care on relative
primary care / specialty earnings. Income growth for primary care physicians differed
significantly across all quartiles, with income growth most rapid in states with high
managed care growth. Incomes of "RAPs" grew more slowly in states with high
70 Ibid., 226.
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managed care growth. Subspecialists had slight income growth in states of all quartiles;
however, the differences between them were not statistically significant.
The study also estimated the relationship between changes in managed care
penetration and annualized rates of growth of physician supply (primary care and
specialists). The study expected to find a positive effect of managed care growth on
changes in the primary care physician-to-population ratio and a negative effect on
changes in the specialty physician-to-population ratio. Due to the substantial costs
incurred from relocating, adjustments in the numbers of physicians are expected to occur
less rapidly than adjustments in compensation.71 The analysis found a relative decline in
the supply of subspecialist and "RAP" physicians in areas with high managed care growth
rates. The primary care physician-to-population ratio increased at a slower rate than the
other two categories in all managed care growth quartiles, and the growth in primary care
physicians was lowest for states with the highest levels of managed care growth. This
does not support the hypothesis that managed care will drive strong growth in
employment opportunities for primary care physicians. Only the results for the "RAP"
group were significant, where their ratios rose 40% faster for states in the lowest quartile
than in states in the highest quartile.
The last part of the study looked at national trends in specialty selection by
medical school seniors using the NRMP data for postgraduate year one and two residency
positions offered and filled from 1989 through 1995. Assuming regional changes forecast
long-term national trends, medical students were expected to increasingly select primary
71 Ibid.. 226.
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care residencies. 72 The results supported that expectation. As discussed earlier, the
number of family practice and pediatric positions filled nationwide rose 32 percent,
suggesting that in the long run the changes noted in physician incomes could translate
into substantial changes in the relative supply of primary care and specialist physicians.
Overall, the study does support the hypothesized effects. The one exception
where geographical areas with increased managed care growth did not lead immediately
to more primary care physicians. However, this may be reflective of costs incurred from
relocating and the lagging short run adjustment to varied demand in geographical areas.
The only weakness identified in this study is that the results may underestimate
the full impact of managed care due to some intrastate variation in managed care
penetration that can be concealed by a state-level analysis. The construction of the
dependent variable (using the annualized rate of change in income vice income level)
minimized the effect of unobservable state-level factors that were unrelated to managed
care growth. An advantage to the SMS data used in this study is that it accounts for a
wide range of different types of managed care delivery systems whereas previous
research has focused on HMO enrollment which constitutes only one-half of the managed
care market.
2. Congressional Budget Office
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted a study in July 1990 to
analyze the effect of alternative plans for paying military physicians based on the
projected size of the medical corps. This was done through the estimated effects of the
72 Ibid., 226.
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pay plans on retention rates. Congress had been satisfied with the current pay system's
basic structure but was interested in approving incremental changes that might reduce the
size and configuration of the medical corps. These changes could include more money
for the across-the-board pays, higher incentive special pay, and initiating the multi-year
special pay to supplement the other pays.
The analysis started by configuring the military physician work force by medical
specialty and accession source. Physicians were grouped into 14 medical specialties that
reflected the classifications used by various pay plans and they used three sources of
entry groups: Non deferred Health Professional Scholarship Program (HPSP), deferred
HPSP, other. Non deferred, or direct, HPSP entrants enter active duty upon completion
of medical school and receive graduate education through the military training program.
Deferred HPSP entrants defer their active duty service to receive residency training in a
civilian training program. Deferred HPSP entrants enter active duty as fully trained
specialists. The CBO study used data from a DoD tape containing information about
whether or not an individual physician left the service during 1988 to estimate retention
rates for each specialty and source of entry combination. This was based on the number
of physicians on active duty at the beginning of 1988 who were at the end of, or past,
their initial obligation, and who did not leave during the year. The retention rates varied
widely for those physicians at the end of their initial obligation and varied over a much
narrower range for those in years of service past their initial obligation. 73
73 CBO, "Options for Paying Military Physicians", 7.
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A model of retention relating the individual physician's decision to stay or leave
to their pay allowed CBO to predict how each of the pay plans would affect the retention
rates of physicians. The decision point was defined as "reaching the end of their initial
period of obligation." Maximum likelihood estimates of a logit model of individual
retention decision were obtained.
The cohort data from the computer tapes had information on individual physicians
from all Services who entered the military between 1981 and 1988. The retention
decision of 1,786 physicians who came on active duty between 1981 and 1987 and whose
initial obligation dates occurred before 1989 (and were at least two years after accession)
was obtained from the data. Physicians were stratified by source of entry. This was done
to control for initial preference for a military career. Since no non-deferred HPSP
students finished their initial obligation before 1989, they were excluded from this
analysis: 650 of the 1,786 physicians joined as deferred HPSP students. Over the 1981-
1988 period 26 percent of the deferred HPSP and 60 percent of the "others" stayed
beyond their initial obligation.
The study estimated a logistic regression for the deferred HPSP group and the
"other" group. The explanatory variables included the natural log of the military-to-
civilian pay ratio, years of practicing medicine, board certification status, citizenship, and
specialty category (primary care or non primary care). The last four variables were meant
to capture the non-pecuniary factors that may influence retention. Military earnings
(RMC + special pays) were estimated for each physician at the time the initial obligation
ended, based on pay grade and years of credible service, specialty, and branch of service.
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Earnings varied slightly over time because of congressionally mandated changes to basic
pay and allowances and ISP. Between 1981 and 1988, ISP changed frequently in amount
and recipient specialties. Estimated civilian earnings were based on AMA data.
When evaluated at the mean values of the other explanatory variables, the
equations for both groups gave similar pay elasticities: Deferred HPSP = .7 and Other =
.5. Given that these two dissimilar groups are similar in their responsiveness to changes
in pay suggests that non deferred HPSP physicians also probably have elasticities in that
range. Physician specialty was not a statistically significant explanatory variable. 74
The CBO study calculated the effects of alternative pay plans, except for the
multi-year option, using the estimated pay elasticities from the logit model. Each plan
resulted in a percentage change in the pay ratio by specialty, so the percentage change in
tl retention rate of each specialty could be estimated. Calculating the effects of the
multi-year pay was more complicated.
A problem with this study might be the inclusion of the physician specialty
categories as explanatory variables. These variables will be correlated with the pay
variable. The larger sample size available for the analysis in this thesis examining all
military physicians should allow for separate logit models for several specialty categories
and control for source of entry with dummy variables in the model. Specialty-specific
elasticities will be more useful for analyzing alternative pay plans that are based on
targeted pays. The elasticities estimated in this thesis will control for differences between
74 Ibid., 61.
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specialties. Also, the model should have included explanatory variables on personal
characteristics.
3. Center for Naval Analyses
The following summarizes three Navy physician pay and retention studies
conducted by McMahon of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA): A Retention Model for
Navy Physicians (1989), Pay and the Retention of Navy Physicians (1989), and Navy
Physicians' Pay Distributions Compared to Civilian Income (1991).
a. Retention Model for Navy Physicians (McMahon 1989)
This study analyzed the sensitivity of retention of fully trained specialist
physicians in the Navy to pay differentials between the civilian sector and the Navy. The
aggregate retention rate for specialists was declining and the results were intended to
guide the policy issue ofhow pay increases could improve retention.75 It may have been
done for the same reason as the CBO study because it applies the estimated specialty-
specific elasticities to indicate which specialists are likely to demonstrate increased
retention under various alternative pay proposals. At the time of the study there was a
positive and growing civilian-military pay differential.
The data consisted of the population of unobligated fully trained
specialists on active duty from The Bureau of Medicine Information System (BUMIS) for
fiscal years 1983 through 1987. CNA maintains a database that provides calculations on
Navy physician income (monetary and imputed). The database also contains background
information, including source of entry. The database included all key variables from FY
75 Joyce S. McMahon, "A Retention Model for Navy Physicians," Centerfor Naval Analyses, (Washington
D.C. June 1989), iii.
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1984 to FY 1987. Variation in income was observed across physicians at a point in time
and for individual physicians across time. The major source of variation in pay is from
the variation in the ISP, and is a limitation of the data for this thesis and of the CBO
study. 76
The BUMIS data did not contain complete information on physicians' pay
and was augmented by constructing physician pay from pay schedules. The constructed
pay variable RMC included the federal tax advantage due to the nontaxable status of
BAQ, VHA, and BAS, and a dependency allowance. All medical special pays were
included.
Civilian physician earnings came from the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC) because it contained information on 22 specialties over a
number of consecutive years. The AMA data was rejected because it only had
information to support analysis of nine specialties. The AAMC data was also felt to be a
more conservative measure of income. The 22 specialties cover 93 percent of the fully
trained navy specialists. The remaining 7 percent did not have good civilian counterpart
data.77 AAMC obtains salary data yearly from over 55,000 full-time medical school
faculty. These faculty members have the following ranks: Instructor, Assistant
Professor, Associate Professor, Professor and Chairman.
Examination of retention for unobligated specialists reveals a large




stable retention rates of 83 percent, while anesthesiologists had retention rates that raised
between 54 and 66 percent. There was no clear trend of retention within specialties over
time. A higher rate of leaving was noted at the end of the initial obligation relative to the
end of a subsequent obligation.78
The average military/civilian pay ratio for specialists dropped from 90.8 to
79.1 percent during the observed period. In FY 1988, the average pay gap for a specialist
was $24,600. The range varied from $1,200 for general pediatricians to $1 17,200 for the
average cardio-thoracic surgeon.
The decision point in this model is assumed to occur one time each fiscal
year, either at the end of an initial obligation or at the end of an annual obligation. The
dependent variable was derived from an observation of an individual physician at a
decision point. The decision to leave was coded as (1), and the decision to stay as (0).
Maximum likelihood logit models were used and focused on the pay differential. Other
explanatory variables included number of dependents, age, minority status, years of
service toward retirement, an observed propensity toward military life, and the source of
entry.
The coefficient of the pay differential variable was statistically significant
and verified that the larger the civilian - military pay differential the higher the
probability of leaving the Navy. The study found that the other variables were significant
also: having dependents was associated with a higher probability of leaving, and both
deferred and non deferred HPSP entrants are more likely to leave. Being older, having
78 Ibid., 4.
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higher rank, being black or female, and being near retirement eligibility were all
associated with a lower probability of leaving. The estimate of the aggregate pay
elasticity for the overall model was approximately .15.
Results of the model were used to analyze the sensitivity of physician
retention to changes in the pay differentials for 22 specialists, but the specialty-specific
elasticities were not based on separate specialty regressions for each specialty. Small
sample sizes did not permit running 22 models and the study did not aggregate specialists
into fewer categories. The P used in this calculation was the aggregate elasticity from
the overall model. The actual probability of leaving and an observed pay gap was used
for each specialty, based on preliminary FY 1988 data, to calculate pay elasticities
separately for each of the 22 specialties.79 This method still does not account for varied
specialty behaviors given that the P is from the overall model. The results did, however,
support the expectation that those specialties with the largest pay differentials will show
the greatest responsiveness of the probability of leaving for a given percentage decrease
in pay. The specialty-specific range was from .72 to .01 with the surgical subspecialists
having the highest elasticities and the primary care physicians the lowest.
This study was re-estimated using the natural log of the military-civilian
pay ratio as in the CBO study. The fit of the model only changed slightly and the other
explanatory variables' significance, sign, and general magnitude did not change. The
elasticity however, was estimated as .83, very close to the estimate of .70 in the CBO
study. When the .83 elasticity was applied to the data the results are essentially the same
79 Ibid., 15.
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as the original CNA model. This provides validation of the two approaches. However,
the weaknesses for the specialty-specific elasticities are still a concern.
b. Pay and the Retention of Navy Physicians (McMahon, 1989)
McMahon's study examines three distinct pay plans proposed to diminish
the civilian-military pay gap. This is done by examining the expected costs, the projected
impacts on retention of physicians by specialty, and the long-run effects for force
management in the Navy. The study recognized that other factors also influence
retention such as working conditions, but these are more difficult to quantify, analyze, or
change quickly.
The data included military physician pay and demographic information.
This was obtained from BUMIS for FY 83 - FY 87 in order to construct the population of
fully trained physicians specialists who were on active duty during this period. Data on
their civilian counterparts was obtained from AAMC. The sample was large enough to
supply information on 22 specialties. Once all the data were received military physician
pay was computed and contrasted with alternative civilian pay by specialty.
CNA's analysis of the data showed that the civilian-military pay
differential was positive and growing for fully trained Navy physician specialists. This
growing gap would likely have some disastrous effects on retention as the civilian
employment opportunities became increasingly attractive. The study showed retention
rates at the end of the initial obligation, the first career turning point had declined, as did
the inventory of fully trained specialists.
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The logit model used to analyze physician retention focused mainly on the
influence of the civilian-military pay gap, while recognizing that many factors that affect
the member's choice to stay or leave. These other factors were personal characteristics,
such as years of service toward retirement, taste for military life, the source of entry and
dependents, among others.
The study concluded that because of the decline in retention and the
growth of the military-civilian pay gap, an argument could be made for boosting the pay
for military physicians. In considering new pay proposals, those in Table 5, there were
two key issues to consider: the proposed pay had to offer military physicians more
comparability with their civilian sector alternatives and it had to address the manpower
shortage issue.
Table 5. Comparison of proposed alternative pay plans
Pay plan Pay raise Coverage
Plan I 48-percent cost of living adjustment to all special pays,
excluding ISP
All physicians eligible for
special pay
Plan II Pay alternative civilian median if FY88 inventory is
less than 90 percent of the FY90 authorized end
strength
All fully trained specialists
who are unobligated
Plan III Pay 90 percent of the alternative civilian median
income. Use a save-pay clause to avoid decreasing
military pay to specialties currently above 90 percent
All fully trained specialists
who are unobligated
Source: Joyce S. McMahon, et al, CNA Research Memorandum 88-266, Pay and the Retention of Navy
Physicians, (Washington, D.C., CNA: May 1989), 18
The alternatives were evaluated on their retention effects and total costs as
found in Table 6. The retention effects were compared to a 1989 baseline plan, which
estimated 310 fully trained and unobligated physicians leaving the Navy. Under Plan I,
23 physicians would be retained. Plan II and III would retain 38 physicians. The total
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costs of these three plans ranged from $13.8 to $15.2 million. CNA acknowledged that
the model may underestimate retention effects, particularly for Plans II and III, because
the proposed pay increases for certain specialties were "beyond the range of variability in
military pay from FY 1984 through FY 1987."
Table 6. Evaluation of expected outcomes of alternative pay plans








Plan I 15.2 23 8,500 10.8
Plan II 13.8 38 13,400 16.0
Plan III 13.7 38 13,300 15.9
Source: Joyce S. McMahon, et al, CNA Research Memorandum 88-266, Pay and the Retention ofNavy
Physicians, (Washington, D.C., CNA: May 1989), ix
Under Plan I, all eligible physicians would receive between $8,200 and
$9,600. The problem with this plan is that physicians with high alternative civilian
incomes receive about the same pay as those physicians who are already receiving
compensations relative to their civilian alternative. This subsequently encourages
retention of pediatricians, family practice physicians and others that are paid relatively
well.
There would be little effect under Plans II and III on family practice,
pediatricians and other physicians with relatively small civilian-military pay gaps, as
these plans focus mainly on increasing pay for specialties with high-income civilian
alternatives. In comparison, Plans II and III are much better plans than Plan I. They
would both save more procedural-based (surgeons) physicians who would otherwise
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leave the Navy. Plan II can address existing shortages more efficiently, whereas Plan III
is simple to calculate and could prevent civilian-military pay gap distortions and
subsequent retention problems.
c. Navy Physicians' Pay Distributions Compared to Civilian Income
(McMahon, 1991)
This study determines actual pay distributions observed for 22 physician
specialties and documents the size of the civilian-military pay differential for three skill
levels within each specialty. These pay differentials are then linked to the acceptance
patterns of the Medical Officer Retention Bonus, thereby allowing this study to evaluate
the impact of the MORB and impact of future pay plans.
An evaluation of all military and physician special pays were calculated in
the overall physician compensation. This included the non-taxable allowances: basic
allowance for quarters (BAQ), variable housing allowance (VHA), basic allowance for
substance (BAS), family separation allowance (FSA). The taxable pays were: career sea
pay and hazardous duty pay. The special pays were: VSP, ISP, BCP, ASP and the 1989
MORB. Of all the special pays, the only two that varied across specialties were the ISP
and MORB.
Compensation profiles for Navy physicians were calculated by obtaining
data from the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS) database for four quarters in
1989. The annualized compensation figures obtained were based on fully trained active
duty physicians. In addition, the JUMPS database was merged with the Officer Master
File and the MORB data to obtain personal data and identify MORB payments.
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Physician annual compensation was computed and presented for 22
different physician specialties by pay grade. The pay grades that were most commonly
observed for fully trained specialists were 04, 05, and 06. Data on civilian
compensation levels obtained from the AAMC most closely matched Navy pay grades,
04 - 06, by the use of assistant professor, associate professor and full professor,
respectively. Civilian compensation amounts represented the physician's net income
before taxes, but after expenses. This income is based on regular faculty salaries plus any
supplemental income from other sources.
In analyzing the effects of MORB on retention, an examination of
orthopedic surgeons revealed that MORB was not appealing to junior orthopedic
surgeons even though they were eligible for the bonus. The study showed that in 1 989 an
04 orthopedic surgeon faced a pay gap of $78,300, while 05's and 06's faced pay gaps
of $92,000 and $94,900 respectively.
Four-year MORB contracts were accepted by most 06 orthopedic
surgeons, thereby reducing their gap to as little as $74,900. On average, 06 orthopedic
surgeons have chosen to be career Navy physicians. The MORB for them is like icing on
the cake, because they planned to remain in the Navy anyway. This is not the case for
the 04 orthopedic surgeon who has an average of 15 years to go until eligible for
retirement. They did not see a benefit of accepting the MORB, which would reduce their
pay gap from $78,300 to $58,600. In 1989, of the 66 orthopedic surgeons 04 and
below, more than half were eligible for the MORB; however, only one accepted the
57
contract bonus. 80 As for the 16 orthopedic surgeons in pay grade 05, most were eligible
for the MORB, but only five accepted. The average 05 orthopedic surgeon has 12 years
of service and is much closer to retirement eligibility.
Analyses of future pay plans should consider several factors in attempting
to increase retention of navy physicians. The first is to acknowledge the variety of
income levels within and between pay grades and specialties. The second is to
acknowledge the variation of alternative incomes across specialties in the civilian sector
and the pay differences as compared to Navy physicians. Lastly, levels of special pay
and bonuses need to be correctly targeted to those specialties that have genuinely large
civilian-military pay differentials, critical needs, or manpower shortages.
80 Joyce S. McMahon, "Navy Physicians' Pay Distributions Compared to Civilian Income", Centerfor
Naval Analysis, (Washington D. C. August 1991).
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III. MULTIVARIATE MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the conceptual framework for the specification of the
multivariate model of retention. It provides a description of the data set using the HMPDS
file from the Defense Manpower Data Center and the civilian physician compensation data
from the Association of American Medical Colleges. The dependent variable is based on the
physician's retention behavior. The chapter also lists the explanatory variables in the model
and their expected effects on the physician retention decision. It delineates the data analysis
using a statistical model to determine the probability that a physician would remain in the
Navy, based on the selected explanatory variables. This chapter also examines the
"goodness of fit" of the model, and the elasticities, and marginal effects of each variable.
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
An analysis of physician retention is based on the ability to define the critical factors
affecting career decisions. The decision to stay or leave can be considered a decision to seek
civilian employment rather than Navy service. Rarely would a physician decide to leave the
Navy unless it was to practice medicine in the civilian sector. Several variables are involved
in the retention decision but the economic elements are expected to serve as the primary
factors affecting this decision.
The model developed for this analysis assumes that physicians are utility
maximizers. The basic human capital theory of mobility is a model of voluntary turnover
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- deciding whether or not to quit. 1 For the purposes of this analysis, voluntary turnover
equates to the issue of retention. The value of the net benefits of voluntary turnover
determines the retention decision. While both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors
contribute to utility, it is assumed that on average physicians are income maximizers and that
pay contributes positively to utility. Human capital theory predicts that a Navy physician
will have a greater probability of seeking civilian employment if the civilian job provides
higher earnings, all else equal. Low retention rates for physicians are a signal that their
military pay is below market equilibrium. 2 Therefore, one of the major factors to consider
is the amount ofpay ("spot" value) a Navy physician receives compared to the pay that could
be earned as a civilian physician.
Another implication of the theory is that Navy physicians are more likely to leave
the Navy when labor markets are stable. 3 An examination of fluctuations in physician
demand in the civilian market would therefore be of interest when evaluating retention,
especially with respect to the variation in demand across specialties.
Human capital theory also supports the expectation that Navy physicians who are
older or have more job tenure are less likely to leave because they represent physicians who
1 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics Theory and Public Policy (New






have probably made a good job-match decision. This relationship may be associated with
higher rank and/or years of service, and the pull of the retirement annuity.
If the sample size permits, a separate regression will be performed for each specialty
category. If the sample size does not allow for individual specialty analysis, specialties
containing a small "n" will be grouped according to the Simon, Dranove, and White study
or the Hay Physicians' Total Compensation Survey. 4 The physician specialty groupings will
be determined in part on the sample size of each medical specialty from the data and based
on the variation in the impact of health care reform (managed care) on the different
specialties. The Simon study uses the following groupings: the "Primary Care," physician
category for the family/general practitioner, general internal medicine, or general
pediatrician; "Medical and Surgical Subspecialty" category for the surgical or internal
medicine subspecialtist who typically provides very little primary care; the "RAP" category
for the radiologist, anesthesiologist or pathologist. RAPs are distinguished from other
specialists because they provide virtually no primary care and historically are closely
associated with inpatient hospital services, which is highly affected by health care reform.
The Hay study uses similar groupings. The "Primary Care" category is defined the
same as the Simon survey. "Hospital-Based"category uses the same breakdown as Simon's
"RAP" category and includes emergency medicine. The "Procedure-Based," physicians
category includes general surgery, orthopedics, and neurological surgery, and




gastroenterology, dermatology, and other specialties. The thesis will use categories similar
to the Hay Group, when breaking down the specialties into groups.
According to Simon, Dranove, and White it is more difficult to predict the impact of
managed care on obstetrics/gynecology, emergency medicine, and psychiatry specialties than
on others. OB/GYNs for example, frequently deliver a mix of primary and specialty care.
The military-specific specialties of aviation medicine and undersea medicine are also
excluded because of the difficulty of predicting the impact of managed care on this group
because the group would yield too few numbers ofNavy physicians for meaningful analysis,
and because there is no civilian equivalent.
The "Primary Care" category is expected to observe a widening pay differential over
the last few years and a higher probability of leaving the Navy in favor of civilian
employment. This is an interesting effect to observe. Typically this category of physicians
has not been the recipient of rapid growth in civilian earnings, nor have they been a targeted
category for retention management by Navy personnel planners. Managed care has
significantly affected hospital-based physicians; so the "RAP" category may be observed to
have a higher probability of staying. Physician income growth has increased only slightly
among the "specialist " category in the Simon study. The expected retention behavior for
this category is uncertain. However, it would be surprising if the retention of the "specialist"
has not changed since the civilian to military pay gap is shifting.
This thesis examines retention rates among the proposed physician specialty
categories, using cross-sectional data, in the years 1992 through 1996. These retention rates
will be compared to those in the years 1984 through 1987. This will allow for a comparison
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of retention rates before and after health care reform and managed care growth impacted
civilian physician earnings. Again, prior studies grouped the physician specialties
differently, so it may be beneficial to calculate retention rates among Navy physicians in the
years 1984-1987 based on the proposed Hay Group specialty grouping. Retention rates
among the specialty categories over time (1992-1996) will also be observed to see if
retention has varied by specialty during managed care growth.
The retention model in this study includes a time-varying index of managed care
growth to observe whether managed care has had an effect on the retention of Navy
physician specialists. The managed care index will be absorbed by regional physician
compensation survey data. The Hay data uses ten regions, while the AAMC data uses four.
This provides the same impact as the managed care penetration index. The model will
estimate the pay elasticities for each specialty category, using logit models. The pay
elasticities can then be compared to the pay elasticities observed in prior studies, where a
managed care environment was not an influencing factor. The specialty-specific elasticities
will be calculated similarly to Dr. McMahon's CNA study, so some assumptions about the
pay effect on specialty-specific retention behavior will allow a meaningful comparison.
C. DATA DESCRIPTION
There are three principal data sources for this study: the Health Manpower Personnel
Data System file and the physician compensation survey from the Hay Group and the
Association of American Medical Colleges. The HMPDS file contains one record for each
service member for the Army, Air Force, and Navy medical communities. This is a pooled,
cross-sectional data set encompassing the years 1992 through 1996. The file is a
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combination of data received from the Active Duty File, the Reserve File and a special pay
tape that are submitted by each service on a yearly basis. The file contains information
encompassing five major areas: primary and medical specialties; education data, including
intern and residency status; pay information detailing various medical specialty pays;
information about current assignments; and personal characteristics and other demographic
data. This thesis will observe Navy physicians from the selected specialties who are
unobligated at the decision point for each of the five years. The decision point is not
restricted to the first career decision point, which occurs after initial obligation expires.
Physicians will be observed at the initial obligation point and subsequent annual decision
points associated with some special pay agreements.
The military pay will include regular military compensation (RMC)(base pay, BAQ,
VHA, BAS) plus applicable special pays (VSP, ASP, ISP, BCP, MSP). Military earnings
will be estimated for each physician at the year of their decision based on pay grade, years
of creditable service, and medical special pays. Creditable service includes all periods that
the officer spent in graduate medical education while not on active duty and all periods of
active duty as a medical corps officer. 5 Variation in earnings will be observed across
physicians at a point in time and for individual physicians across time. Military earnings
probably will not vary much over time and may be a weakness with this data set. Currently
all Special Medical Pays are collected in the HMPDS database. Social security numbers
from the HMPDS file will be matched with the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS)
5
Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 21 August 1997,
Memorandum "Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 Medical Officer Special Pay Plan," Health Affairs, Washington D.C.
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file to permit calculation ofRMC. The RMC is then added to the physician's special medical
pays to produce the total military pay.
There are a number of sources of information on the earnings of civilian physicians
that could be used to measure the civilian income alternatives ofNavy physicians. The three
main organizations that collect information on civilian physicians' compensation were
reviewed. These sources were the American Medical Association (AMA), the Hay Group,
and the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC). The thesis uses similar criteria
as prior CNA studies regarding the civilian-military pay differential and retention. The first
criterion is the civilian data must span from the years 1992 through 1996 and allow for pay
comparisons. Second, the earnings information should be stratified by medical specialty and
by experience level within each specialty. Third, the sample size in each category must be
large enough to support statistical analysis. Last, the measurement of civilian pay
alternatives should be conservative to ensure against overestimating the civilian-military pay
gap-
The AMA data collects earnings information by surveying approximately 4,000
physicians using the Socioeconomic Monitoring System. However, the sample size only
supports a stratification of nine specialties. After stratification, the sample does not provide
information on experience levels, and is not available for all of the years in this study.
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The Hay Group is a human resources consulting firm who provides integrated
solutions to organizations seeking rapid, sustainable change. 6 The Hay group provides
compensation and informational services to organizations to help them determine
competitive pay and benefits levels. The Hay Group surveyed 158 health care organizations,
providing data representing 20,000 physicians. This survey represents physician
compensation in a rapidly changing health care environment. This is accomplished by
representing health care organizations from different industry sectors and geographic
locations. Health care organizations are categoried by the following industry sectors: (45%)
group practice, (37%) HMO, and (18%) hospital/medical center. The survey represents
physicians in nine regions. The Hay Group provided a custom report to DoD based on the
information in their databases. The survey data is currently used annually by the Navy to
determine multi-year specialty pay.
Although the Hay data provides a managed care representation of earnings in the
private sector, the survey has limitations when used to compare military and civilian
earnings. The Hay data stratifies physicians into 20 specialties. Although this provides more
stratification than the AMA data, it does not cover the twenty-two specialties in our study,
leaving gaps when making earnings comparisons. In calcuating pay differentials, this forces
one to group three surgical subspecialties (plastic, neurological, and cardiovascular/thoracic
surgery) into one category. One must also group internal medicine subspecialties such as
cardiology and gastroenterology together into one category (internal medicine
subspecialties).
Hay Group Online. Available: HttpVwww.haygroup.com/na/service.html ; Internet accessed November 1997.
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The second limitation to the Hay data is that it does not provide experience levels in
each specialty. One is forced to compare both an 0-6 and 0-4 specialist to the same Hay
survey earning amount. For example, an 0-4 Radiologist earning $105,400 and an 0-6
earning $130,200 are compared to a single civilian pay of $227,700. The process of
grouping surgical specialties into one element gives less latitude and inaccurately estimates
the pay differential for three surgical subspecialties and the internal medicine subspecialties.
Thirdly, we are concerned with the geographic representation of the survey
respondents. California is one of nine regions in the survey, yet it represents 40 percent of
respondents. The densely populated New England region, which includes New York and
Massachusetts, represents only 8 percent of survey respondents. Managed care growth
ranges from 30 to 40 percent for the New England region. Further limitations are that the
Hay survey does not separate fixed income with supplemental income, and does not account
for malpractice insurance.
The AAMC data contain information on medical school faculty salaries for the
academic year, similar to the government fiscal year. The AAMC receives about 60,000
survey responses. This is fifteen times the sample size of the AMA and three times the size
of the Hay survey. The AAMC survey accounts for managed care penetration through
geographic location of respondents similar to the Hay survey. The AAMC divides the
respondents into four regions rather than nine for the Hay survey. The earnings information
contained by the AAMC includes fixed base salaries, not influenced by practice earnings,
and the supplemental component derived from practice earnings, whether they are
institutional or outside. The academic data have less variation in among the lowest and
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highest paid specialties compared to the other alternative data series. The AAMC data are
stratified by 22 specialties, which gives greater latitude with respect to surgical specialties
than the AMA and Hay Group data series. 7
Distributions for annual compensation were calculated for 22 specialties by pay
grade. This study matches the Navy 0-4 through 0-6 pay grades with data from the
American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC) obtained for assistant professor,
associate professor, and full professors. The AAMC data are based on faculty salaries plus
supplemental income from outside sources. The AAMC data were used due to relatively
large sample sizes, consistent reporting from year to year, level of specialty detail,
comparability with regard to non-monetary compensation, and comparability to previous
CNA studies which used AAMC data. Additionally, AAMC data represent physicians who
have employer fringe benefit coverage and malpractice insurance, conditions that are
comparable to those ofNavy physicians. 8
The AAMC provides salary data on physicians employed as medical college faculty.
Trends in civilian physician earnings across time can be observed with more variation than
for Navy physician earnings over time.
D. OBLIGATION
The review of an officer's initial obligation helps illustrate overall patterns of
retention and experience among Navy physicians. Previous studies have defined obligation
7 Academic salaries are not the perfect substitute for private sector earnings. The study used academic
salaries, because it was the best civilian salary data available that pertained to civilian positions comparable
to Navy physician duties and experience. A review of research on Navy retention and pay suggests that
AAMC data provide a measure of civilian compensation as good as non-academic earnings.
8 Joyce S. McMahon, Navy Physicians ' Pay Distributions Compared to Civilian Income, CNA (1991 ).
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in various ways. The thesis uses Amy Graham's definition from a CNA report titled
"Defining the Initial Obligation for Navy Physicians."9
The concept of an initial obligation for Navy physicians is explained for both General
Medical Officers (GMO) and specialists. The initial obligation for GMOs is the obligation
that the physician incurs through an accession program. 10 The initial obligation for specialist
is the obligation that the physician incurs through accession and any Navy residency training
programs." Obligation for a second residency initiated while under obligation for training
or accession programs is considered part of the initial obligation.
Identifying initial obligation with the available data from DMDC and BUMIS is a
complex process, because the length of obligation varies with accession program and training
pipeline. Amy Graham's study reveals that the length of initial obligation varies from 2.6
to 7.5 years.
12
Retention at the completion of initial obligation varies by specialty and
accession program. Generally, direct accessions have higher retention rates than the Armed









Force's Health Professions Scholarship Program. 13 The completion of initial obligation
seems to be the career decision point for Navy physicians. 14
This study attempted to track obligation by using two variables from the BUMIS file.
The obligated service date (OSD) identifies the year and the month in which the physician's
most recent obligation ends. The obligated service code (OSC) identifies the type of
program for which the physician specialist is obligated. Identifying the end of an initial
obligation requires a substantial amount of information on each physician. This study was
unable to precisely determine the end of initial obligation with the available data from
BUMIS because BUMIS does not directly record the length of an obligation that a physician
incurs. A non-deferred scholarship participant may be obligated for four years, while a direct
procurement physician may be obligated for two, three, or four years. The majority of
BUMIS obligation data for an individual's obligation prior to the most recent obligation date
was inconsistent. Using the most recent obligation date, it is not possible to determine
whether a physician is serving under a subsequent obligation or at the end of initial
obligation. Additionally, a physician who passed the initial obligation point may augment
or incur an obligation for other reasons. To overcome these limitations, a longitudinal
database needed to be created across time for each individual record. Therefore, the model
looks at the retention of physicians under both their initial obligation and their subsequent







1. Dependent Variable Specification
The physician's actual behavior in a given category is the dependent variable. SSNs are
matched to the loss file to obtain information on the retention behavior. If a physician is
observed at year t and not observed at year t+1, the retention decision was to leave (time
period = 1992 - 1996). The binary dependent variable is named Stay and coded as a (1) when
the physician stays and (0) when the physician leaves.
2. The Explanatory Variables
The factors chosen for inclusion in the model are largely based on McMahon's
previous CNA study. Each variable is defined below. Following the variable explanation,
Table 7 lists the explanatory variables proposed for the model and their expected effects on
the physician retention decision.
a. Military/Civilian Pay Differential
The current-year military/civilian pay differential is the variable of primary
interest and is labeled Paydif. The other variables are selected because they are likely to
influence the stay/leave decision and need to be included in the model to correctly estimate
the true independent effect of Paydif. Physician military pay is obtained by summing regular
military compensation (basic pay, BAQ, VHA, BAS) and applicable medical special pays
(VSP, ASP, ISP, BCP, MSP). Comparable civilian physician pay data is obtained from the
AAMC. The method of calculating Paydif is based on prior CNA studies described in
Chapter II. The individual physician's military pay is subtracted from their civilian
physician counterpart, and is based on specialty and experience level. Experience levels used
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for Navy physicians are those most commonly observed for fully trained specialists in pay
grades 04, 05 and 06. These pay grades are comparable to AAMC's assistant professor,
associate professor, and full professor, respectively. The expected effect is that the higher
the value of Paydif, the higher the probability that a physician will leave the Navy. This is,
the greater the civilian to military pay gap, the greater the incentive to leave the Navy. All
physician specialty groups would be expected to leave the Navy as the pay gap widens.
However, the magnitude of the effect may differ significantly. This effect can be captured
in the specialty -specific elasticities that measure the percentage change in the probability
a physician will leave with respect to the percentage change in the pay ratio.
b. Marital Status
Family responsibilities, whether it is a spouse or child, may affect a
physician's decision primarily due to the involuntary mobility associated with military
service that can be disruptive to family lifestyles and goals. The data file lacked information
on children, so the study looks at the effects of whether a physician is married. The variable
is named Married and is a dummy variable controlling for the effects of having a dependent.
If the physician is married at the time of the decision then Married = (1); otherwise Married
= (0). There is no distinction made between a spouse and children in specifying the variable.
A single officer without dependents is assumed to be more consistent with a Navy lifestyle.
The presence of dependents is expected to lead to a lower probability that a physician
chooses to remain in the Navy.
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c. Rank
A higher rank is assumed linked with positive non-pecuniary factors and an
indicator of a good job-match. The higher-ranking physician is therefore more likely to stay.
A set ofdummy variables for Rank will be used for 04 through 06 and coded as ( 1 ) if the
physician holds the indicated rank at the time of the decision, and coded (0) otherwise.
d. Minority Status
Minority status may have an impact on the attractiveness of Navy
employment. However, how it influences the decision will depend on the perception by
minorities that opportunities are better or worse in the Navy. The expected effect is therefore
uncertain. Possibly since EEO programs are relatively extensive in the military service,
racial minorities may feel opportunities are better in the military and more likely to stay.
This variable is named Minsta and is coded (1) if the physician was nonwhite and (0)
otherwise.
e. Gender
This variable is named gender and is coded (1) if the physician is female and
(0) otherwise. The expected effect is that females will have a higher probability of remaining
in the Navy.
f. Years of Service (YOS)
To capture the effect of military retirement on the stay/leave decision, it is
assumed that, ceteris paribus, the more years of creditable service toward retirement a
physician has the more likely he or she will stay. After 20 years of creditable service it is
assumed that the observed probability of a decision to stay will decrease. This interpretation
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is an attempt to control for the effect of military retirement incentives without the complex
procedure of converting the incentives into a discounted present value framework. The
expected relationship is that the greater years a physician has in the Navy the more likely
they will stay. This variable is named YOS and measures the length of years of service at the
time of the decision. The YOS variable is broken down into four separate dummy variables
(YOSl=0-9 years of service, YOS2=10-14 years, YOS3=15-19 years, and YOS=20+ years).
This variable and Age may be collinear.
g. Procurement
Procurement may be a strong predictor and worthy of examination, based on
results of McMahon's CNA study where non-deferred (direct) HPSP entrants were
associated with a higher probability of leaving and deferred HPSP entrants were twice as
likely to leave than non-deferred HPSP entrants. This relationship may offer insight for
future retention management. It may also indicate a difference in the propensity for military
service (as believed in the CBO study). The categories chosen are the deferred and non-
deferred Armed Forces Health Professional Scholarship Program (AFHPSP), Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), direct accession and other. These
categories will be represented by a set ofdummy variables and coded as (1) if the physician
was commissioned via the indicated source.
h. Age
Older physicians are more likely to have better information regarding optimal
job-matches so they would have made an informed choice when they joined the Navy and
are therefore less likely to leave than younger physicians. The variable named Age is defined
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as the age of a physician (years) at the time of the retention decision. However, age was
taken out of the model, because of the high correlated with rank and years of service.
i. Taste for Navy life
Propensity for Navy life is another factor that is difficult to quantify. Our
model is designed to measure the decision to leave or stay on an annual basis, so it is
possible to observe repeated decisions to stay by the same physician. Controlling for the
other factors, it will be assumed that repeated observations on the same unobligated
physician indicate a high taste for Navy life. One decision to stay will likely increase
subsequent decisions to stay. However, the dummy variable for Taste was taken out of the
model, because of the high correlation with the dependent variable of the stay/leave decision.
Physician dissatisfaction with working conditions is likely to impact on the
decision to leave. However, collecting information on this factor and measuring it correctly
is extremely difficult. Survey data and factor analysis would need to be part of this study.
This study excludes the perceptual variable ofjob satisfaction. McMahon's position was that
failure to account for this factor will weaken the overall predictive ability of the model for
a given physician, but that across all physicians the effects should not add bias, or lessen the
predictive ability.
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Table 7. Explanatory variables with the expected sign of regression coefficient
Variable Expected Sign of
(at time of decision) Regression
Coefficient
Definition
Paydif (-) Continuous: Range: >0; <1
Married (-) Categorical: married = 1; else
Rank (-) Categorical: 04=1; else
(+) 05=1; else 0, 06=1; else
YOS (-) Categorical: YOS 1=1; else
( + ) YOS2=l; elseO, YOS3=l; else
(-) Y0S4=1; elseO
Procure (-) Categorical: DHSPS=1; else
NDHSPS=l;elseO
( + ) USUHS=1; elseO DIR=1; else
Other =1; else
Minsta (+) Categorical: Minsta=l; else
F. STATISTICAL MODEL
A logit model will be used to determine the probability that a physician would leave
the Navy, given the independent variables. Logit models are appropriate because the
dependent variable, Y, is dichotomous. The dependent variable is derived from an
observation of an individual physician at the decision point (end of an obligation period and
each subsequent year). The stay/leave decision is represented byl if the physician stays in
the Navy and if the physician leaves. The logistic regression model which utilizes
maximum likelihood estimation is a more appropriate estimation procedure than linear
multiple regression models using ordinary least squares. Most important, a linear regression
76
model estimated with OLS to predict stay or leave decisions may result in predicted values
greater than 1 or less than 0. This would not make much sense, so the preference is a
nonlinear technique. The logistic regression model specifies that all predictions fall within
the 0-1 range.
15
The dependent variable measures retention behavior as the log of the odds ratio of
the probabilities of the physician leaving or staying. A realistic assumption would be that
the probabilities change more slowly as they approach or 1 . The effect of a unit change in
Xi on P is greatest when P = 0.5 and least when P is close to or 1. Changes in the
independent variables will have their strongest effect on the probability of leaving or staying
in the Navy at the midpoint of the distribution. A physician with a strong preference to leave
the Navy will not be nearly as influenced to remain in the Navy despite more pay, as the
physician who is on the fence about the stay/leave decision. This assumption is reflected in
the cumulative logistic distribution. The LOGISTIC procedure, using the Statistical Analysis
System (SAS) software package, will be used to estimate the logistic regression. The
LOGISTIC procedure fits the logistic multiple regression to a single binary dependent
variable by computing maximum likelihood estimates. 16
A brief description follows of the method of nonlinear estimation used to predict the
probability that a physician will choose to stay in the Navy. The factors believed to
15 Damodar N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York: McGaw-Hill, 1995), 554.
16 Kathryn Kocher, Selected SAS Documentation: Manpower, Personnel, and Training Analysis
(Naval Postgraduate School, 1996), 14.
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influence the stay/leave decision of the individual physician are linked to a model that creates
a prediction of the physician's choice and is written as: P = E(Y=1 | Xi) = a + Xi + pXi + s
where P = the probability that a physician stays in the Navy
Y = 1 if the physician chooses to stay in the Navy
Y = if the physician chooses to leave the Navy
X = a vector of independent variables that may influence the choice to leave or sta>
for the ith observation
a = a constant intercept term
p = a vector of parameter estimates
8 = independently distributed random variable with mean
This model can be written to represent the cumulative logistic distribution:
Pi = E(Y=l 1/2Xi) = 1









A decision to stay will be based on a variety of factors, so that some index Z exists
for every physician. Z is a theoretical unmeasured continuous variable that represents the
physician's attitude toward staying in the Navy. At some value of Z, a threshold is passed
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and the physician decides to stay in the Navy. There is some Z* which represents a cutoff
value that translates the unobservable index Z into a decision to leave or stay. Specifically:
Physician stays ifZ > Z* and Physician leaves ifZ < Z*. 17
It has been verified that when Zi ranges from - oo to + oo, Pi ranges between and 1 and that
Pi is nonlinearily related to Zi. This means that OLS should not be used to estimate the
parameters.
18
The logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability distribution function
specified in equation (A) above. That equation can be further transformed to demonstrate
how it is intrinsically linear.







Now, Pi / (1- Pi) is simply the odds ratio in favor of staying in the Navy - the ratio of the
probability that a physician will stay in the Navy to the probability that he or she will leave
the Navy. 19
17 Joyce S. McMahon, A Retention Modelfor Navy Physicians, (Center for Naval Analysis, June 1989), B-2.




Taking the natural log of the above equation yields,
Li = log Pi = Zi = a + fi%i.
1-Pi
(C)
Li is the log of the odds ratio and is linear in X and in the parameters. This is the logit
model. Although the logit model is linear in X, the probabilities themselves are not, the
probabilities do not increase linearly with X. The logit model assumes that the log-odds ratio
is linearly related to Xi. The slope = dP/dX = (52 P (1 - P), and will vary because the rate
of change in probability with respect to X involves not only p2 but also the level of
probability from which the change is measured. 20 That is, the change in the probability
associated with a change in one of the X variables will be dependent on the value of that
variable and on values of other X variables. The logit model slope can be directly interpreted
as the change in the log-odds ratio for a unit change in X, that is, it tells how the log-odds
in favor of leaving the Navy change as say the pay variable increases by one unit of
measurement ($000). The intercept term is the log-odds in favor of staying if an independent
variable is zero and has little meaning.
Given certain values for the independent variables, the estimated probability of
staying in the Navy, rather than the odds in favor of staying in the Navy, can be estimated.






In order to get the a and (3 values for the logit, the maximum likelihood method is used.
1. Goodness of Fit
The Wald statistic is used to test the hypothesis that a parameter is equal to zero. This
is a maximum likelihood chi-squared statistic, calculated by dividing the parameter estimate
by its standard error and squaring the result.
2. Elasticity
The logit model coefficients can be converted to elasticities in order to interpret how
much the probability of staying the Navy changes as the pay variable changes. The policy
implications are that if the pay differential is reduced, on average, for a group of physicians,
retention is expected to increase and the expected percentage retention increase can be
described in terms of the elasticity. The elasticity of the probability of leaving with respect
to an independent variable is given by |3Xi(l - P), for continuous variables, or dP/dX * X/P,
and = %A in probability of leaving/ %A in X . A positive sign on the coefficient means that
an increase/decrease in a particular variable will increase/decrease the probability of staying,
respectively. The magnitude of the increase/decrease is given by the elasticity. If the
elasticity = .7 and the pay differential were reduced by 10 percent, the probability of staying
would be expected to increase by 7 percent, resulting in a predicted increase in retention.
Kocher, 14.
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The specialty-specific elasticities will also be computed if the sample size permits running
a regression for each specialty category.
3. Marginal Effects Analysis
The relative impact of each variable on retention can also be computed using
marginal effects analysis. The differences in probability of staying for a "reference
physician" within each specialty category are computed, and that difference reflects the
magnitude of the effect. Marginal effects are computed by first, obtaining the (3's from the
logit regression and then defining the reference physician. The reference case is often
evaluated at the mean value of the continuous variables. Second, using the reference
physician's variable values obtain their predicted probability of staying. Next, change the
value of a given variable (the pay variable) by one unit of measurement and hold the value
of the other variables constant, then obtain a new predicted probability. The difference
between the two predicted probabilities is the change in probability that Y = 1
.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses analytical results for the effect of the civilian-military pay
differential and other demographic factors. The main analytical issue is the quantification
of the role of the civilian-military pay differential on the retention of physicians. The first
segment of this chapter provides an analysis of compensation profiles for Navy physician
personnel from the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS) database. This segment
calculates civilian-military pay gaps for 22 physician specialties, where high managed
care penetration has affected the civilian-military pay differentials throughout the country
during health care reform (1992-1996).
Previous analysis from prior CNA studies revealed that Navy medicine had a
growing retention problem among those completing their initial obligation among certain
specialties. The second segment of this chapter updates the analysis of physician
retention using 1992-1996 data. The analysis will determine the retention rates among
unobligated physicians in a health care reform environment.
The third segment of this chapter provides results of the physician retention model
described in Chapter III, linking various characteristics of fully trained specialists to the
observed probability that they will leave the Navy. This model quantifies the effect of
military-civilian pay differentials have on retention, while controlling for other factors
likely to affect retention. This segment evaluates the sensitivity of retention to changes
in the relative size of the military-civilian pay differential.
B. PAY DIFFERENTIAL
Previous studies have indicated significant gaps between civilian and military
physician compensation. These studies have verified the presence of positive civilian-
military pay gaps for physicians, and have documented high variations in pay across
different civilian specialties and low variation in Navy pay. As mentioned in Chapter II,
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regular military compensation for physicians consists of the following: base pay, basic
allowances for subsistence (BAS), basic allowance for quarters (BAQ), and in some cases
variable housing allowance (VHA). 1 In addition, physicians receive variable special pay
(VSP), incentive special pay (ISP), additional special pay (ASP), board certified pay
(BCP), and in some cases multi-year special pay (MSP).
In calculating the monetary compensation profiles, data was obtained for fully
trained physicians from the JUMPS tape on active duty on all pays received by these
physicians during each calendar year. For the years 1992-1996, the JUMPS pay data
were merged with historical data for each physician from the DMDC Health Manpower
Personnel Data System (HMPDS). Supplementary pay records for Medical Officer
Retention Bonus/Multi-year Specialty Pay recipients from the Bureau of Medicine
Information System (BUMIS) were also merged to enable accurate pay distributions to be
calculated.2 The pay data view a snapshot of personnel from 1992 through 1996. The
pay reported includes all monetary pays.
There are a number of sources of information on the earnings of civilian
physicians that could be used to measure the civilian income alternatives of Navy
physicians. The three main organizations that collect information on civilian physicians'
compensation were reviewed.
Comparisons for annual compensation were calculated for 22 specialties by pay
grade. This study matches the Navy 0-4 through 0-6 pay grades with data from the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) obtained for assistant professor,
associate professor, and full professors. The AAMC data are based on faculty salaries
plus supplemental income from outside sources. Table 8 shows the comparison of mean
1 In January 1998, VHA and BAQ were combined to form the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH). This
study uses VHA and BAQ rates when calculating RMC.
2 The Medical Officer Retention Bonus was replaced by the Multi-year Specialty Pay in 1992.
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earnings for Navy physicians and their AAMC counterparts by experience level for 1996.
Appendices B and C provide pay comparison summary data for Navy physicians by
specialty for 1996. Table 8 shows that the pay gap tends to widen as physicians approach
higher levels in each organization. There are a greater variety of earnings across
specialties in the civilian sector than in the Navy. The mean income in the Navy in 1996
for an 0-4 fully trained specialist ranged from $87,200 in Family Practice to $101,600 for
Orthopedics and Radiology. In the civilian sector, the range for assistant professors (0-4
equivalent) using AAMC data ranged from $101,100 in Neurology to $226,900 in
Orthopedic surgery. For 0-6 physicians, the Navy had a range of mean income from
$125,700 in Pathology to $153,800 in Orthopedics. In the civilian sector, the range for
full professor (0-6 equivalent) ranged from $137,600 in Family Practice to $433,400 in
Cardiovascular/thoracic surgery. The mean pay differential for all levels of experience
(0-4, 0-5, 0-6) ranged from $5,800 for Neurology to $241,200 for
Cardiovascular/thoracic surgeons.
Table 8. Comparison ofNavy physician specialist pay to alternative civilian pay for 1996
Median Income Civ-Mil Mean Income Civ-Mil Navy
Navy AAMC difference Navy AAMC difference Inventory
Emergency Medicine
04 90,000 133,000 43,000 91,500 135,600 44,100 69
05 124,700 149,000 24,300 120,000 151,300 31,300 27
06 134,300 164,000 29,700 133,900 167,600 33,700 9
Anesthesiology
04 107,800 150,000 42,200 101,400 156,900 55,500 92
05 128,900 184,000 55,100 128,600 191,700 63,100 40
06 147,000 204,000 57,000 146,000 209,800 63,800 21
Dermatology
04 89,700 120,000 30,300 89,300 137,800 48,500 28
05 111,500 164,000 52,500 1 14,000 187,400 73,400 14
06 135,700 169,000 33,300 135,300 200,900 65,600 12
Family Practice
04 85,900 104,000 18,100 87,200 107,300 20,100 78
05 115,000 120,000 5,000 114,700 123,200 8,500 95
06 125,900 128,000 2,100 125,900 137,600 11,700 56
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Neurology
04 95,100 94,000 -1,100 91,000 101,100 10,100 13
05 118,700 121,000 2,300 119,100 124,900 5,800 10
06 139,500 148,000 8,500 136,200 159,700 23,500 9
Obstetrics and Gynecology
04 102,900 147,000 44,100 101,900 156,400 54,500 61
05 124,900 183,000 58,100 123,700 196,300 72,600 24
06 149,900 200,000 50,100 147,300 218,100 70,800 15
Ophthalmology
04 105,400 138,000 32,600 99,700 156,900 57,200 32
05 128,100 188,000 59,900 126,900 202,200 75,300 29
06 145,600 195,000 49,400 147,300 220,700 73,400 16
Otolaryngology
04 92,300 164,000 71,700 91,300 188,300 97,000 49
05 127,300 200,000 72,700 122,500 221,100 98,600 18
06 148,600 223,000 74,400 148,100 247,600 99,500 8
Pathology
04 99,100 104,000 4,900 95,200 107,700 12,500 36
05 118,700 132,000 13,300 118,300 133,700 15,400 38
06 127,700 157,000 29,300 125,700 160,600 34,900 20
Pediatrics
04 89,200 97,000 7,800 88,100 103,100 15,000 29
05 110,900 115,000 4,100 108,900 123,600 14,700 16
06 126,000 138,000 12,000 126,200 146,900 20,700 25
Preventive Medicine
04 82,800 97,000 14,200 88,700 101,400 12,700 19
05 1 14,600 104,000 -10,600 111,300 119,900 8,600 33
06 127,200 139,000 11,800 126,600 150,800 24,200 27
Psychiatry
04 87,600 99,000 11,400 88,600 101,500 12,900 44
05 115,000 120,000 5,000 111,900 122,700 10,800 32
06 129,600 143,000 13,400 130,900 149,900 19,000 34
Radiology
04 107,100 156,000 48,900 101,600 158,400 56,800 94
05 132,300 195,000 62,700 129,000 195,700 66,700 38
06 142,600 212,000 69,400 143,900 212,300 68,400 17
General Surgery
04 102,200 155,000 52,800 100,600 165.900 65,300 92
05 128,900 202,000 73,100 127,700 22: 200 97,500 46
06 144,900 227,000 82,100 147,500 24. 500 94,000 30
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Neurological Surgery
04 111,600 203,000 91,400 99,100 222,300 123,200 16
05 ns 269,000 ns ns 302,200 ns 3
06 143,500 316,000 172,500 147,200 346,000 198,800 4
Orthopedic
04 112,800 198,000 85,200 101,600 226,900 125,300 88
05 135,300 235,000 99,700 134,500 255,900 121,400 19
06 156,600 244,000 87,400 153,800 274,800 121,000 24
Plastic Surgery
04 ns 168,000 ns ns 196,600 ns 2
05 145,400 226,000 80,600 140,300 259,500 119,200 6
06 ns 263,000 ns ns 287,500 ns 1
Cardiovascular-Thoracic Surgery
04 ns 200,000 ns ns 222,300 ns 1
05 135,100 293,000 157,900 132,800 374,000 241,200 7
06 ns 362,000 ns ns 433,400 ns 2
Urology
04 93,500 147,000 53,500 92,000 150,900 58,900 32
05 130,100 211,000 80,900 125,400 220,900 95,500 11
06 152,100 213,000 60,900 150,000 242,400 92,400 8
Gastroenterology
04 99,200 110,000 10,800 99,200 1 14,600 15,400 6
05 121,800 156,000 34,200 122.800 158,700 35,900 11
06 136,800 164,000 27,200 137,000 169,100 32,100 5
Cardiology
04 101,100 137,000 35,900 101,100 150,400 49,300 21
05 119,400 165,000 45,600 119,100 177,000 57,900 4
06 137,700 186,000 48,300 134,500 203,000 68,500 4
Internal Medicine
04 85,000 103,000 18,000 88,800 112,300 23,500 41
05 121,200 127,000 5,800 116,500 138,200 21,700 18
06 130,000 155,000 25,000 128,800 165,800 37,000 25
Note: Figures were rounded to the nearest 100.
a. ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
b. Mean and median may be volatile because of small population size.
Figure 10 and 11 graphically illustrate the difference in earnings over time
between the civilian sector (AAMC data) and the Navy. The earnings levels for the
hospital based, office based, and primary care categories for the Navy in figure 10 are
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grouped much closer together than the civilian sector in figure 1 1 . For the civilian sector,
there is a larger variation between the procedural specialty earnings and the other three
categories. Additionally, the private sector experienced a greater variation between















Figure 10. Military pay by specialty grouping
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Figure 1 1 civilian pay by specialty grouping
Table 9 illustrates the change in pay differentials and pay ratios by specialty
between 1984 and 1996. 3 The physician specialties are listed in order by the following
four categories: primary care, hospital based, office based, and procedural based.
Figure 1 and 1 1 show that the group arrangement is consistent with low paying
specialties (family practice, pediatrics, and general medicine) to high paying specialties
(specialty surgery).
Table 9 reveals the high degree of income dispersion among specialties in the
civilian sector compared to the Navy. The pay differential is particularly acute in high
paying specialties in the civilian sector. The pay ratios for all specialties fell over the 12-
year period. Pay ratios are listed, because they control for inflation. The aggregate pay
differential increased from $25,200 to $55,800, but the pay ratio fell from .79 to .66.
3 The pay ratio is defined as the military earnings to civilian earnings. A ratio of .94 for a Neurologist
means that on average a navy Neurologist earns 94 percent of his civilian counterpart in that particular
specialty at a point in time. It is calculated by dividing military earnings by civilian earnings.
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Neurologists show the smallest widening of the pay ratio between the Navy and
civilian sector from 1984 to 1996, whereas neurological surgeons have experienced the
greatest decrease in the pay ratio from 1984 to 1996. The pay ratio for Neurology only
slipped from .94 to .89 over twelve years. However, the pay ratio for neurological
surgeons fell sharply from .71 to .39 over the 12-year period. For the primary care
category the pay ratios fell from 1984 through 1996. Family practice specialists pay ratio
declined from .97 to .87. The pay ratio for pediatrics fell from 1.10 to .85, while general
medicine fell from .97 to .79. In 1984, Navy pediatricians were paid $6,200 more than
their civilian counterparts. Table 9 displays comparisons of Navy and alternative civilian
pays for unobligated specialists in 1984 and 1996 using AAMC survey data. As
previously stated, the emphasis in primary care and managed care penetration in the
private sector has had an influence on the declining pay ratio for family practice and
pediatric specialists since 1984. Earnings data for 1984 in Emergency and Preventive
Medicine were not provided in the CNA study.
Table 10 illustrates the change in pay differentials and pay ratios by specialty
from 1992 and 1996. The physician specialties are listed in order grouped by the
following four categories: primary care, hospital based, office based, and procedural
based. Neurologists show the smallest pay gap between the Navy and civilian sector for
1996 ($13,600), whereas Cardiovascular/thoracic surgeons have the largest pay
differential ($232,200). The pay differential for Neurologists has been decreasing for the
last four years, from $22,200 to $13,600. From 1992-1996 the pay ratio for neurologists
improved from .79 to .89. A summary of AAMC and Hay Group physician
compensation data can be found in Appendix D.
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Table 9. Comparison of Navy and civilian pay (AAMC data) unobligated fully trained specialists, FY
1984 and FY 1996
Average: Physician's Pay ($)
Specialty Navy Civilian (AAMC) Differential Ratio
1984
Family Practice 65,600 68,000 2,400 .97
Pediatrics 66,200 60,000 (-6,200) 1.10
Internal Medicine 67,900 69,900 2,000 .97
Emergency Medicine ns ns ns ns
Radiology 68,500 93,900 25,400 .74
Anesthesiology 74,500 101,300 26,800 .73
Pathology 69,100 71,300 2,200 .97
Dermatology 72,800 70,700 (-2,100) 1.03
Neurology 66,600 71,900 5,200 .93
Ob/Gyn 69,600 89,900 20,300 .78
Ophthalmology 70,600 96,200 25,600 .73
Otolaryngology 77,900 100,500 22,700 .78
Preventive Medicine ns ns ns ns
Psychiatry 69,500 72,900 3,400 .95
Urology 75,900 94,200 18,300 .81
Gastroenterology 66,500 75,900 9,500 .88
Cardiology 70,800 82,400 11,500 .86
General Surgery 81,000 103,300 22,300 .78
Neurological Surgery 80,200 113,600 33,300 .71
Orthopedic 79,600 114,400 34,800 .70
Plastic Surgery 84,300 122,300 38,000 .69
Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 90,600 138,700 48,100 .65
1996
Family Practice 106,000 121,300 15,300 .87
Pediatrics 104,800 123,400 18,600 .85
Internal Medicine 105,800 133,800 28,000 .79
Emergency Medicine 97,200 142,400 45,200 .68
Radiology 108,500 174,000 65,500 .62
Anesthesiology 112,500 173,300 60,800 .65
Pathology 109,100 129,500 20,400 .84
Dermatology 101,900 164,700 62,800 .62
Neurology 111,400 125,000 13,600 .89
Ob/Gyn 111,000 175,200 64,200 .63
Ophthalmology 115,800 187,200 71,400 .62
Otolaryngology 103,500 202,500 99,000 .51
Preventive Medicine 110,200 126,000 15,800 .87
Psychiatry 106,700 122,600 15,900 .87
Urology 101,900 180,400 78,500 .57
Gastroenterology 119,600 149,000 29,400 .80
Cardiology 108,200 161,300 53,100 .67
General Surgery 110,400 195,600 85,200 .56
Neurological Surgery 98,000 254,200 156,200 .39
Orthopedic 111,400 239,900 128,500 .46
Plastic Surgery 121,900 248,600 126,700 .49
Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 138,500 370,700 232,200 .37
ns: not shown; 1989 CNA study did not analyze that specialty for 1984
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For the primary care category in Table 1 there were mixed results in the trend
in pay ratios between 1992 and 1996. Family practice specialists' pay ratio declined from
.89 to .87. The pay ratio for pediatrics rose from .83 to .85, while general medicine rose
from .74 to .79. The pay ratio for family practice specialists from 1984 to 1996 fell from
.96 to .87. The emphasis in primary care and managed care penetration in the private
sector may have been one factor explaining the declining pay ratio for family practice and
pediatric specialists since 1992.
Changes in pay ratios were found among hospital based specialists of Emergency
Medicine, Radiology, Anesthesiology, and Pathology. Radiologists and Pathologists had
only a minimal increase in pay ratios. The pay ratio for Anesthesia specialists rose from
.57 to .68, as the pay differential closed from $68,300 to $60,800. This supports a
previous observation in chapter II regarding the modest growth of seven percent in
private sector Anesthesia specialist earnings over the past four years. Emergency
Medicine specialist's pay ratio rose from .60 to .68. The demand for emergency medicine
physicians in the private sector has declined due to strict managed care rules regarding
emergency room visits. With the exception of life threatening injuries, loss of limb, or
eye sight, many managed care patients are restricted from urgent care and emergency
room visits without first contacting either their primary care physician or triage nurse.
Six of the ten office-based specialists experienced decreasing pay ratios (and
increasing pay differentials), while Gastroenterology and Neurology experienced pay
ratio increases. Neurology experienced an increase from .79 to .89. Cardiology
experienced a declining ratio .72 to .67 over the four-year span. Preventive Medicine also
experienced a declining from .96 to .87. Four of the five procedural specialty pay ratios
remained stable over the four-year period, despite increases in the pay differential.
Neurological surgery experienced a decrease in pay ratio (.44 to .39). Orthopedic surgery
had minimal improvement in the pay ratio (.45 to .46).
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Table 10. Comparison of Navy and civilian pay (AAMC data), unobligated fully trained specialists, FY
1992 and FY 1996
Average : Physician's Pay ($)
Specialty Navy Civilian (AAMC) Differential Ratio
1992
Family Practice 85,400 95,700 10,300 .89
Pediatrics 85,400 102,800 17,400 .83
Internal Medicine 82,800 111,900 29,100 .74
Emergency Medicine 75,800 127,200 51,400 .60
Radiology 94,000 154,100 60,100 .61
Anesthesiology 91,800 160,100 68,300 .57
Pathology 91,900 110,300 18,400 .83
Dermatology 85,500 140,100 54,600 .61
Neurology 85,400 107,600 22,200 .79
Ob/Gyn 100,500 152,100 51,600 .66
Ophthalmology 97,900 158,900 61,000 .62
Otolaryngology 87,400 163,000 75,600 .54
Preventive Medicine 94,400 97,900 3,500 .96
Psychiatry 90,500 107,700 17,200 .84
Urology 93,300 165,900 72,900 .56
Gastroenterology 88,800 111,900 23,100 .79
Cardiology 93,300 130,200 36,900 .72
General Surgery 94,500 170,100 75,600 .56
Neurological Surgery 89,600 205,200 115,600 .44
Orthopedic 92,400 205,700 113,300 .45
Plastic Surgery 107,300 212,600 105,300 .50
Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 103,100 277,100 174,000 .37
1996
Family Practice 106,000 121,300 15,300 .87
Pediatrics 104,800 123,400 18,600 .85
Internal Medicine 105,800 133,800 28,000 .79
Emergency Medicine 97,200 142,400 45,200 .68
Radiology 108,500 174,000 65,500 .62
Anesthesiology 1 12,500 173,300 60,800 .65
Pathology 109,100 129,500 20,400 .84
Dermatology 101,900 164,700 62,800 .62
Neurology 111,400 125,000 13,600 .89
Ob/Gyn 111,000 175,200 64,200 .63
Ophthalmology 115,800 187,200 71,400 .62
Otolaryngology 103,500 202,500 99,000 .51
Preventive Medicine 110,200 126,000 15,800 .87
Psychiatry 106,700 122,600 15,900 .87
Urology 101,900 180,400 78,500 .57
Gastroenterology 119,600 149,000 29,400 .80
Cardiology 108,200 161,300 53.100 .67
General Surgery 110,400 195,600 85,200 .56
Neurological Surgery 98,000 254,200 156,200 .39
Orthopedic 111,400 239,900 128,500 .46
Plastic Surgery 121,900 248,600 126,700 .49
Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 138,500 370,700 232,200 .37
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In Table 1 1 , the Hay survey data produces different results than the AAMC data.
Both the aggregate pay differentials and the pay gap for the Hay data are much wider than
the AAMC data. The pay gap difference is substantial as well. The AAMC aggregate
pay gap in 1996 is .66, while it is .58 using the Hay group data. The Hay data shows the
smallest pay gap is found in Family Practice ($19,200), whereas Neuro-surgery
experienced the largest gap.
The Hay data illustrates the following results for each specialty grouping.
Primary care had results that were very consistent with AAMC data. Family Practice
and Pediatrics experienced a stable pay ratio over the four-year period, while Internal
Medicine showed improvement from .57 to .63. From 1992 and 1996 civilian Internal
Medicine specialist earnings growth (24 percent) were outpaced by Navy earnings growth
(28 percent), resulting in an improved pay ratio.
The results for two of the four hospital-based (Emergency Medicine and
Pathology) specialties were consistent with the AAMC data. The results for Anesthesia
and Radiology differed. Using AAMC data the pay ratio for Anesthesiologists increased
from .57 to .65, consistent with civilian market trends of reduced earnings growth.
However, the Hay data showed a decrease of the pay ratio from .52 to .50. Radiology
showed a decreasing pay ratio using Hay data, but an increase using AAMC data.
Five of the ten office-based specialties saw a narrowing of pay ratios, while other
office specialties were stable. Urology experienced a modest widening. For procedural
specialties, Cardiovascular/thoracic and orthopedics saw a modest improvement, while
Neurological and plastic surgery experienced decreasing pay ratios from 1992-1996.
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Table 1 1 . Comparison ofNavy and alternative civilian pay (Hay Group data) for unobligated fully trained
specialists, FY 1992 and FY 1996
Average Physician's Pay ($)
Specialty Navy Civilian (Hay Survey) Differential Ratio
1992
Family Practice 85,400 104,600 19,200 .82
Pediatrics 85,400 108,400 23,000 .79
Internal Medicine 82,800 112,800 30,000 .57
Emergency Medicine 75,500 141,100 65,300 .54
Radiology 94,000 183,800 89,800 .51
Anesthesiology 91,800 176,300 84,500 .52
Pathology 91.900 153,300 61,600 .60
Dermatology 85,500 149,900 64,400 .57
Neurology 85,400 144,400 59,000 .59
Ob/Gyn 100,500 179,200 78,700 .56
Ophthalmology 97,900 173,600 75,700 .56
Otolaryngology 87,400 177,600 90,200 .49
Preventive Medicine 94,400 139,100 44,700 .68
Psychiatry 90,500 129,400 38,900 .70
Urology 93,000 177,200 84,200 .52
Gastroenterology 88,800 145,400b 56,600 .61
Cardiology 93,300 145,400b 52,100 .64
General Surgery 94,500 169,300 74,800 .56
Neurological Surgery 89,600 241,900a 152,300 .37
Orthopedic 92,400 241,900 149,500 .38
Plastic Surgery 107,300 241,900a 134,600 .44
Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 103,100 241,900a 138,800 .43
1996
Family Practice 106,000 128,400 22,400 .83
Pediatrics 104,800 133,200 28,400 .79
Internal Medicine 105,800 140,600 34,800 .63
Emergency Medicine 97,200 184,200 87,000 .53
Radiology 108,500 227,700 119,200 .48
Anesthesiology 112,500 222,800 110,300 .50
Pathologv 109,100 180,400 71.300 .60
Dermatology 101,900 177,800 75,900 .57
Neurology 111,400 162,400 51,000 .69
Ob/Gyn 111,000 203,000 92,000 .55
Ophthalmology 115,800 196,300 80,500 .59
Otolaryngology 103,500 210,900 107,400 .49
Preventive Medicine 110,200 146,200 36,000 .75
Psychiatry 106,700 148,900 42,200 .72
Urology 101,900 208,100 106,200 .49
Gastroenterology 119,600 166,800b 47,200 .72
Cardiology 108,200 166,800b 58,600 .65
General Surgery 110,400 195,000 84,600 .57
Neurological Surgery 98,000 298,800a 200,800 .33
Orthopedic 111,400 271,100 159,700 .41
Plastic Surgery 121,900 298,800a 176,900 .41
Cardio/Thoracic Surgery 138,500 298,800a 160,300 .46
a/b: Hay data grouped three surgical specialties together and two medicine specialties together.
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The thesis found an inconsistency in the Hay data for Anesthesia earnings. In a
1995 article from Hospitals and Health Networks, the Hay Group published Anesthesia
earnings figures, which saw an 8 percent growth from 1992-1994(stated in chapter II).
The Hay Group data provided to DoD Health Affairs revealed a 19 percent growth in
Anesthesia earnings (1992-1996). The Hay Group earnings data found in the 1995 article
are more consistent with current private sector trends than the Hay Group data provided
to DoD Health Affairs. Anesthesia earnings reviewed by Health Affairs may be over-
estimated, resulting in an over payment of specialty pays to Anesthesia specialists.
Figure 12 presents military and civilian pay over time using mean earnings
between Pediatricians (primary care) and Cardio/thoracic surgeons (procedural). In 1996
the pay differential for Pediatricians was small ($18,600), relative to Cardio/thoracic
surgeons ($232,000). This suggests the reasoning why DoD pays higher specialty
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Figure 12. Civilian vs. Military physician pay differences, fiscal years 1992 - 1996
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C. PHYSICIAN RETENTION
Compensation schedules affect fully trained physicians in a number of ways: the
attractiveness of direct accession physicians, physician enrollment in a residency
program, and retention decisions for fully trained specialists. Retention problems usually
develop among physicians who have the best civilian alternative pay, all other factors
constant. The analysis of physician retention uses pooled cross-sectional data from of
the Health Manpower Personnel Data System (HMPDS) for 1992-1996 provided by
DMDC. All retention figures are calculated for the actual number of specialists onboard
during the specified time period.
1. Aggregate Continuation and Retention Rates
Yearly continuation rates for physician specialists have been consistent over the
past five years. The yearly continuation rate measures the percentage of physicians (both
obligated and unobligated) on active duty at the beginning of the fiscal year who are still
on active duty at the end of the year. For example, the aggregate continuation rate is
measured as follows:
number on active duty at the beginning of FY92 who
remained on active duty as of the beginning of FY93
C92 =
number of active duty at the beginning of FY92
Depending on the accession source Navy physicians can incur up to eight years of
active duty service. Unlike continuation rates, retention rates distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary continuation by focusing on unobligated physicians. The
retention rate is calculated as follows:
number on active duty at the beginning of FY 1 992 who are
unobligated or are due off an obligation during FY 1992
who remained on active duty as of the beginning of FY1993.
R92 =
number on active duty at the beginning of FY 1 992 who are
unobligated or are due off an obligation during FY 1 992
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Tables 12 and 13 provide aggregate continuation and retention rates for fully
trained Navy specialists for the years 1984-1988 and 1992-1996 respectively. The
retention rates listed in Table 13 are lower in the 1990's than during the 1980's. After
controlling for involuntary losses and erroneous obligation data, the sample size used in
this thesis (Table 13) was lower than in previous CNA studies (Table 12).
Table 12. Specialist continuation and retention rates, FY 1984-1988 (population size in
parenthesis)
Continuation rate Retention
Fiscal vear (Obligated & unobligated) (Unobligated)
1984 88 (3,847) 76(1,500)
1985 89 (3,930) 76(1,573)
1986 89 (3,954) 76(1,583)
1987 88 (3,947) 74(1,569)
1988 88 (3,896) 72(1,463)
Source: Derived from CNA Study "Retention of Navy Physicians 1984-1988."
Table 13. Specialist continuation and retention rates, FY 1992-1996 (population size in
parenthesis)
Continuation rate Retention
Fiscal vear (Obligated & unobligated) (Unobligated)
1992 86(2,214) 63 (691)
1993 83 (2,132) 60 (690)
1994 82 (2,092) 51 (669)
1995 81 (1,947) 53 (573)
1996 87(1,854) 63 (569)
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey CA.
Table 14 illustrates retention rates by specialty at the end of an obligation. The
retention rates are listed by specialty groupings. The retention rates for the specialties
tend to be erratic over the four-year period. Therefore, no real trends can be determined
by specialty from this table.
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Table 14. Retention by specialty at the end of an obligation
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Primary Care
Family Practice 0.63 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.63
Pediatrics 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.27 0.66 0.65
Medicine 0.52 0.76 0.41 0.50 0.67 0.63
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.68 0.65 0.60
Radiology 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.47 0.42 0.52
Anesthesiology 0.53 0.65 0.45 0.62 0.63 0.61
Pathology 0.62 0.84 0.63 0.70 0.79 0.73
Office Based
Dermatology 0.69 0.63 0.37 0.35 0.60 0.51
Neurology 0.78 0.75 0.57 0.50 0.67 0.65
Ob/Gyn 0.43 0.23 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.42
Ophthalmology 0.60 0.62 0.75 0.63 0.77 0.68
Otolaryngology 0.67 0.48 0.38 0.52 0.90 0.63
Prev Med 0.75 0.64 0.77 0.75 0.55 0.72
Psychiatry 0.69 0.60 0.73 0.55 0.68 0.66
Urology 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.88 0.29 0.60
Gastroenterology 0.73 0.46 0.46 0.73 0.67 0.61
Cardiology 0.50 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.33
Procedure Based
General Surg 0.73 0.64 0.46 0.49 0.64 0.63
Neuro-surgery 0.43 a 0.20a 0.50a 0.25 a 0.20a 0.32 a
Orthopedic 0.62 0.47 0.35 0.41 0.67 0.56
Plastic 1.00
a 1.00a 0.50a 0.60a 1.00a 0.79a
Cardio/Thoracic - 1.00 a 1.00a 1.00a 1.00a 1.00a
a: Rates may be significantly affected by the behavior of a few physicians due to small population size.
Source: Derived from data provided by DMDC, Monterey, CA.
Figure 13 shows trends in physician retention from 1992-1996 by specialty
grouping. This gives a clearer picture of physician specialty retention over time than
Table 14. Retention for all of the specialty groupings decreased from 1992 through 1994,
leveled out, and increased in 1996. Primary care specialists experienced the most
dramatic shift in retention as it fell sharply from 68 percent to 46 percent between 1993-
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1995. Primary care retention recovered to 66 percent by 1996. After a significant
decrease from 1992-1995, procedural-based physician retention rebounded in 1996.
0.80
Retention Rates by Group
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Primary Care 0.63 0.68 0.58 0.46 0.66 0.64
Hospital Based 0.55 0.62 0.54 0.62 0.62 0.61
Office Based 0.65 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.61 0.59
Procedure Based 0.70 0.66 0.56 0.55 0.70 0.60
Total 0.63 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.61
Figure 13. Retention rates for physicians by specialty grouping from 1992-1996.
Source: Derived from data provided by DMDC, Monterey, CA.
2. Specialty Continuation and Retention Rates
Table 15 compares average historical continuation and retention rates for 1984-
1987 with the corresponding rates from fiscal year 1992-1996 for 21 specialties.
Gastroenterology has been left out due to ambiguity in how CNA defines the Internal
Medicine-other category.
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Table 15. Specialty continuation and retention rates for fully trained specialists (includes
executive medicine) (population size in parentheses)
Continuation Retention
Average Average Average Average
FY1 984- 1987 FY 1992-1996 FY1984-1987 FY 1992-1996
Emergency Med. 84 (70) 89 (471) 80 (41) 60 (112)
Anesthesiology 77 (417) 82 (846) 61 (217) 61 (322)
Dermatology 83 (162) 85 (322) 80 (122) 51 (84)
Family Practice 81 (853) 86 (1186) 73 (515) 63 (330)
Neurology 85 (97) 89 (161) 77 (65) 65 (40)
Obstetrics/Gyn 77 (488) 79 (479) 65 (286) 42 (144)
Ophthalmology 83 (238) 90 (382) 77 (168) 68 (91)
Otolaryngology 76 (187) 86 (410) 66 (122) 63 (100)
Pathology 85 (329) 89 (498) 81 (238) 73 (151)
Pediatrics 87 (818) 77 (703) 83 (624) 65 (307)
Preventive Med. 87 (127) 81 (488) 84 (92) 72 (103)
Psychiatry 85 (403) 87 (601) 81 (312) 66 (177)
Radiology 77 (441) 86 (746) 64 (255) 52 (180)
General Surgery 80 (518) 84 (898) 75 (331) 63 (293)
Neurological Surg 68 (37) 82 (111) 45 (20) 32 (25)
Orthopedic 82 (337) 82 (711) 71 (194) 56 (217)
Plastic Surgery 82 (34) 89 (56) 76 (17) 79 (14)
Cardio/thoracic Surg 78 (45) 86 (65) 68 (25) 80 (6)
a
Urology 80 (160) 84 (273) 75 (107) 60 (89)
Cardiology 81 (133) 81 (181) 74 (84) 33 (46)
Internal Medicine 85 (572) 74 (505) 78 (362) 63 (176)
All fully trained 82 (6,466) 84(10,093) 75 i(4,197) 61 I(3,007)
a: Rates may be significantly affected by the behavior of a few physicians due to small population size.
Source: Data for 1984-1987 were obtained from the 1989 CNA study "Retention of Navy Physicians, FY
1984-1987" by Amy Graham and Laurie May. Results for 1992-1996 were derived from data provided by
DMDC, Monterey, CA.
For FY 1992-1996 16 of the 21 specialties experienced a continuation rate that
was higher than the FY 1984-1987 period. In 18 of the 21 specialties, the retention rate
for unobligated specialists fell below the average for 1984-1987. This would indicate that
a large number of physicians on active duty from 1992-1996 were obligated. The high
number of obligated physicians from year to year helps maintain a high continuation rate.
However, retention rates have fallen below the historical average. Pediatrics, Internal
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Medicine, and Preventive Medicine experienced reduced continuation rates compared to
1984-1987. Two of these three are primary care specialties and may have been affected
by a combination of shorter obligation periods and an increased opportunity to practice
medicine in the private sector. The largest percentage point differences between current
and historical retention rates occurred in Cardiology, Emergency Medicine, and
Dermatology. Anesthesiology, Plastic surgery, and Cardiovascular/thoracic surgery had
increasing retention rates in the 1990's, indicating that decreased civilian earnings growth
may have had an influence on retention. The grass may not have been greener in the
civilian sector as in previous years (1980's).
3. Authorizations by Specialty
Relative to authorizations, a few specialties have an acute manpower shortage.
Navy physician billet authorizations reflect short-term inventory goals. Authorized
billets are funded by Congress and generally reflect current manpower needs. Table 16
examines 22 specialties and displays manning levels for FY1988 from a prior CNA
retention study.4 There were 15 of 22 specialties that were manned below authorization,
and 13 specialties were manned at less than 90 percent. After reviewing FY 1991
inventory to authorization, Table 16 indicates that 12 specialties were manned below
authorization. Between FY 1988 and 1991, the inventory shortfall had increased in
Emergency Medicine, Obstetrics/Gynecology, General Surgery, and Orthopedic Surgery.
The increased shortfall in Emergency Medicine physicians is due to an increase in
authorization. This increase in authorization may be a reflection of policy change in the
practice of contracting Emergency Room physicians.
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Using data provided by the Bureau of Medicine, Table 17 examines 22 specialties,
and displays manning levels for 1992 and 1996. In 1996 there were 11 of 22 specialties
manned below authorization, and 6 of the 22 specialties are manned below the 90 percent
authorization level. The gap between FY 1996 inventory and authorizations for
Emergency Medicine, Pathology, and Obstetrics/Gynecology, Ophthalmology,
Psychiatry, and General Surgery has improved (narrowed) substantially since FY 1988.
In FY 1992 and 1996, Family Practice has undergone a growing shortfall between
authorizations and inventory. This is related to a large increase in authorization of 38
between 1991(242) and 1992 (280). Authorizations also increased by 34 between 1992
(280) and 1996 (314). Inventory for Internal Medicine between 1992 and 1996 increased
from 194 to 245 (26 percent), while authorizations for this period only increased from
195 to 202 (4 percent). This caused an inventory overage of 43 Internal Medicine
specialists. In response to lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm, the Navy
increased its emphasis on primary care by increasing the number of authorizations for
Family Practice physicians (1992 and 1996) and Internal Medicine specialists (1992). A
combination of the increased authorizations due to policy change and an increased
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D. PHYSICIAN RETENTION MODEL RESULTS
The logistic regression model used focuses on the influence of the civilian-
military pay differential on the decision to leave the Navy. The model predicts the
probability that a physician will stay in the Navy, given the values of the independent
variables described in Table 18.
Table 18. Definitions of independent variables
Variable Definition
Paydif Pay differential between the civilian alternative earnings and Navy
earnings for a particular fiscal year (= civilian pay - military pay).
Female = 1 if female
Married3 = 1 if married
Single = 1 if single
DIRECT = 1 if Direct accession
USUHS = 1 if accession via uniformed school health sciences medical school.
DAFHPSP = 1 if accession via deferred scholarship status.
AFHPSP3 = 1 if accession via non-deferred scholarship.
Other = 1 if procurement is other than those listed above.
LCDRa = 1 if 0-4.
CDR = 1 if 0-5.
CAPT = 1 if 0-6.
Minsta = 1 if non-white.
YOST = 1 if <10 years of creditable service.
Y0S2 = 1 if >10 < 15 years of creditable service.
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YOS3 = 1 if > 15 < 20 years of creditable service.
YOS4 = 1 if> 20 years of creditable service.
FamPrac 3 = 1 if Family Practice physician.
a: Omitted category (reference group)
Table 1 9 presents the results of the logit model using AAMC data with fixed
effects. The use of fixed effects for each physician specialty isolates and controls for the
effect of each of the retention differences across specialties. The results indicate that the
larger the pay differential between the military and civilian sector, the lower the
probability that a physician will stay in the Navy. The reference case is defined as the
following: a married, white, male, non-deferred scholarship entrant, LCDR Family
Practice physician with ten or less years of service. It was found that married physicians
are associated with a lower probability of staying in the Navy. Deferred scholarship
entrants were associated with a lower probability of staying in the Navy. The USUHS
variable was not statistically significant (.8376), probably due to small class size each
year (<150). Physicians of higher rank were associated with a higher probability of
staying in the Navy. Physicians having between 15 and 20 (YOS3) years of service were
associated with a higher probability of staying. However, once a physician reaches 20
years of service (YOS4), there is a sharp decrease in the probability of remaining in the
Navy. Minorities were also associated with a higher probability of staying in the Navy.
According to previous studies referenced in Chapter II, it is possible that minority
physicians expect to face less employer or patient discrimination in the Navy than in the
private sector. The gender (female) variable was not statistically significant (.2921).
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Table 19. Logit retention model analysis for fiscal year 1992 throuj>h fiscal year 1996
(with fixed effects) (AAMC data)
Variable Coefficient Std Error Chi-squarea P-valueb
Intercept .5452 .1347 16.3752 .0001
Paydif -.00000918 .000002379 14.8905 .0001
Female .1626 .1543 1.1098 .2921
Single .4357 .1313 11.0075 .0009
Direct .1334 .1580 .7130 .3985
USUHS -.0426 .2079 .0420 .8376
DAFHPSP -.5529 .1171 22.3012 .0001
Other -.2014 .1896 1.1281 .2882
CAPT 1.3007 .2396 29.4646 .0001
CDR .8252 .1530 29.0932 .0001
Minsta .5079 .1995 6.4806 .0109
YOS2 .1902 .1270 2.2420 .1343
YOS3 .6179 .2131 8.4030 .0037
YOS4 -.9021 .2371 14.4782 .0001
ER -.0787 .2623 .0900 .7642
DERM -.6150 .2762 4.9572 .0260
NEURO -.1883 .4376 .1851 .6671
OBGYN -.5940 .2213 7.2052 .0073
OPTH .5074 .2976 2.9073 .0882
ENT .5426 .2788 3.7875 .0516
PATH -.0246 .2494 .0097 .9215
PEDS -.6051 .1930 9.8306 .0017
PREV -.0272 .3204 .0072 .9324
PSYCH -.4647 .2264 4.2144 .0401
RAD -.2638 .2145 1.5125 .2188
GENSURG .3173 .1954 2.6364 .1044
NEUROSURG -.4473 .5504 .6605 .4164
ORTHO .3796 .2533 2.2459 .1340
PLASTIC 1.5195 .8293 3.3571 .0669
CARDVASC 1.7952 1.2753 1.9915 .1582
UROL .2043 .2753 .5505 .4581
GASTRO -.3250 .3615 .8083 .3686
CARD -1.1368 .3749 9.1949 .0024
INTMED -.3992 .2099 3.6161 .0572
Notes: Model chi-square = 285.91 with 33 DF; (-2 LOG L.R.) P=0001; sample size = 3,192
a. Wald chi-square statistic
b. The probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypotheses that the coefficient is zero. The smaller the
value, the more likely that the coefficient is not zero.
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Table 20 presents the model results using Hay Group physician compensation data
rather than AAMC data for civilian compensation. In viewing the pay differential
coefficient, the data suggests that the pay differential has a weaker affect on a physician's
decision to stay than the model using AAMC data. The minority variable had a slightly
higher significance level than in the AAMC model, while physicians having between 15
and 20 years of service (YOS3) had a slightly lower significance level than the AAMC
model. All of the physician specialty affects on the model were consistent with the use
of AAMC data, with the exception of Emergency Medicine, Neurology, Preventive
Medicine, and Pathology. These differences are most likely due to these specialties
having much lower pay differentials using the AAMC data.
Table 20. Logit retention model for fiscal year 1 992 through fiscal year 1996 (with fixed
effects) (Hay Group data)
Variable Coefficient Std Error Chi-squarea P-valueb
Intercept .4403 .1637 7.2361 .0071
Paydif -.00000481 .000002333 4.2547 .0391
Female .0363 .1609 .0509 .8214
Single .4621 .1401 10.8710 .0010
Direct .1237 .1640 .5691 .4506
USUHS -.0898 .2248 .1596 .6895
DAFHPSP -.4853 .1253 15.0081 .0001
Other -.2248 .1971 1.13013 .2240
CAPT 1.0065 .2346 18.4008 .0001
CDR .5447 .1484 13.4730 .0002
Minsta .6493 .2092 9.6286 .0019
YOS2 .1580 .1338 1.3944 .2377
YOS3 .5365 .2170 6.1139 .0134
YOS4 -.9523 .2473 14.8291 .0001
ER .1177 .2930 .1615 .6878
DERM -.5569 .2932 3.6068 .0575
NEURO .1657 .4437 .1395 .7087
OBGYN -.5062 .2682 3.5635 .0591
OPTH .5729 .3258 3.0925 .0787
ENT .3732 .2996 1.5511 .2130
PATH .4354 .2714 2.5733 .1087
PEDS -.3329 .2007 2.7517 .0972
PREV .4543 .3222 1.9879 .1586
PSYCH -.1719 .2396 .5143 .4733
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RAD -.1125 .2764 .1656
GENSURG .1947 .2246 .7518
NEUROSURG -.6986 .6036 1.3397
ORTHO .1259 .2840 .1966
PLASTIC 1.5779 .8738 3.2609
CARDVASC .8099 1.2307 .4331
UROL .1843 .3056 .3640
GASTRO -.00687 .3711 .0003
CARD -1.0878 .3891 7.8159











Notes: Model chi-square = 241.56 with 33 DF; (-2 LOG L.R.) P=.0001; sample size = 3,192
a. Wald chi-square statistic.
b. The probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypotheses that the coefficient is zero. The smaller
this value, the more likely that the coefficient is not zero.
Table 21 restates the model in Table 19, but without using fixed effects for physician
specialty. The table shows the weakened affect of the pay differential due to pay
differential variation. The variation of the pay differential across specialties absorbs the
influence of the pay gap on retention and other characteristics in the model.
Table 2 1 . Results for logistic regression analysis for fiscal year 1 992 through fiscal year
1996 (without fixed effects) (AAMC data)
Variable Coefficient Std Error Chi-squarea P-valueb
Intercept .2412 .0977 6.0973 .0135
Paydif -.00000396 .00000124 10.1910 .0014
Female .0595 .1482 .1613 .6880
Single .3752 .1277 8.6257 .0033
Direct .1746 .1523 1.3137 .2517
USUHS -.0478 .2030 .0554 .8139
DAFHPSP -.4806 .1129 18.1309 .0001
Other -.0860 .1846 .2168 .6415
CAPT 1.0373 .2244 21.3702 .0001
CDR .7110 .1420 25.0592 .0001
Minsta .4685 .1966 5.6792 .0172
YOS2 .2259 .1246 3.2870 .0698
YOS3 .6339 .2083 9.2575 .0023
YOS4 -.8307 .2304 13.0047 .0003
Notes: Model chi-square =226.632 with 13 DF; (-2 LOG L.R.) P=.0001; sample size = 3,192
a. Wald chi-square statistic
b. The probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypotheses that the coefficient is zero. The smaller
this value, the more likely that the coefficient is not zero.
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Table 22 restates the model in table 20, but without fixed effects. Similar to Table
21, the variation of the pay differential across specialties absorbs the influence of the pay
gap on retention and other characteristics in the model.
Table 22. Results for logistic regression analysis for fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year
1996 (without fixed effects) (Hay Group data)
Variable Coefficient Std Error Chi-squarea P-valueb
Intercept .2695 .1277 4.4533 .0348
Paydif -.00000292 .00000131 4.9620 .0259
Female -.0213 .1538 .0192 .8897
Single .4156 .1361 9.3306 .0023
Direct .2090 .1581 1.7476 .1862
USUHS -.1064 .2192 .2358 .6272
DAFHPSP -.4293 .1202 12.7531 .0004
Other -.1130 .1920 .3462 .5563
CAPT .9593 .2271 17.8493 .0001
CDR .5840 .1439 16.4709 .0001
Minsta .6119 .2062 8.8061 .0030
YOS2 .1984 .1306 2.3061 .1289
YOS3 .5065 .2131 5.6473 .0175
YOS4 -.9313 .2415 14.8711 .0001
Notes: Model chi-square = 191.150 with 13 DF; (-2 LOG L.R.) P = .0001; sample size = 3,192
a. Wald chi-square statistic
b. The probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypotheses that the coefficient is zero. The smaller
this value, the more likely that the coefficient is not zero.
1. Marginal Effects
Marginal effects discussed in this section are calculated using the fixed effect
models for the AAMC in Table 19 and the Hay Group data in Table 20. The marginal
effects of the pay gap to retention discussed here are at the aggregate level. Specialty-
specific marginal effects are discussed in the next section. The mean pay differential for
the base case the Hay model was higher ($59,697) than in the AAMC model ($47,098).
This difference in the mean pay differential affected the aggregate and specialty-specific
elasticities.
In the base case of a married, LCDR, white, male, non-deferred scholarship
entrant, Family Practice physician, the expected probability to stay with a pay differential
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of $47,098 was .53. The probability of staying when the pay differential increased by one
standard deviation (to $85,055) yields a stay probability of .44. A decrease in the pay
differential of one standard deviation to $9,141 yields a stay probability of .61. The
wideness of the standard deviation illustrates the variation in civilian pay. Appendix E
summarizes the marginal effects for each physician characteristic.
The impact of the pay differential is less sensitive to retention in the Hay data
model than the model using AAMC data. While the mean pay differential for the Hay
data model is larger ($59,697) than the mean pay differential for the AAMC data model
($47,098); the coefficient of the pay differential for the Hay data model is smaller
(.00000481) then the coefficient used with AAMC data (.000000918). The retention rate
is .54 using the Hay data model and .53 using the AAMC data model. The larger Hay
Group mean pay differential and smaller impact of the coefficient may explain a similar
retention rate in the Hay data model. Using the Hay data model for the reference case of
a married, LCDR, white, male, non-deferred scholarship entrant, Family Practice
physician, the probability of staying when the pay differential decreased by one standard
deviation to $21,304 yields a stay probability of .58. The probability of staying when the
pay differential increased by one standard deviation (to $98,089) yields a stay probability
of .49.
2. Elasticity of Retention
The main purpose of this logit retention model shown in Table 1 9 is to evaluate
the influence of the pay gap on retention. The model in Table 1 9 indicates that the pay
differential is correlated with retention. The elasticity of retention with respect to the pay
differential is:
Percent change in the probability of staying
Elasticity = -
Percent change in the pay differential
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The elasticity can be calculated from the following formula:
Elasticity = (1 - P) * P * Paydif
where
P = Estimated coefficient of the Paydif variable.
Paydif = Mean of the Paydif variable.
P = Probability of retention for the sample.
Using AAMC data in Table 19, the elasticity is approximately .20 {(1-.53) *
.00000918 * $47,098)}. A reduction in the average pay differential by 100 percent
would increase the probability of staying by 20 percent. If the aggregate probability of
staying were .53 for the sample, this would yield an increase in the expected retention
rate to .63. For example, suppose the Navy had 1,000 unobligated specialists in a given
fiscal year. Based on the model, 530 specialists would be expected to remain in the
Navy. If the pay gap were closed to zero, 636 specialists would choose to stay. This
would result in a retention of 106 specialists who otherwise would have been expected to
leave the Navy.
As mentioned in chapter two, the aggregate pay elasticity in Dr. McMahon's
study was .15. For comparison, this study recalculated the elasticity for leaving. 5 The
elasticity is .23. Thus, it appears that the elasticity has increased between the 1980's and
1990's. The aggregate pay elasticity for the leaving model using the Hay Group data is
.16 (.00000481 * .46 * $59,697). It appears in the Hay data model that the elasticity has
increased slightly between the 1980's and 1990's. Using Hay Group data, physicians are
5 In recalculating the elasticity for leaving, the logit model was modified by removing the descending code
from the Job Control Language. This switched the signs of the parameter estimates to model for leaving as
opposed to staying. Only the signs of the coefficients changed {(1-.47) * .00000918 * $47,098}=23.
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less sensitive to pay (.16) than this thesis study (.23) and slightly more sensitive to pay Dr.
McMahon's study (.15). In making a comparison between the thesis and Joyce
McMahon's study, physicians are more sensitive to pay in the 1990's than during the
1980's There is little difference between elasticities using the Hay Group data and Joyce
McMahon's study However, the thesis has previous indicated that the Hay group data is
less differentiated in experience level and specialty stratification than the AAMC data.
3. Specialty Group Elasticities
Pay differential elasticities were calculated for each specialty using AAMC data.
This procedure was estimated by using the coefficient from the all-specialty model, the
actual specialty-specific probability of staying, and the specialty-specific mean pay
differential for a given year or an averaged group of years. For example, the average
retention for a Pediatrician from 1992-1996 is .65 and the pay differential for this specialty
for that time period is $15,422. The maintained assumption is that the estimated pay
differential coefficient is the same for all specialties. The calculated elasticity using the
AAMC data model coefficient with fixed effects (.00000918) is .09.
Table 23 lists the specialty specific elasticities. The results from Table 23 indicate
that the elasticities are large for procedural (surgical) specialties and relatively low for
Primary Care physicians. Primary care physicians are not as sensitive to pay as surgical
specialties. Generally, specialties with the largest pay differentials show the greatest
responsiveness Elasticities by specialty for each year from 1992 through 1996 are
provided in Appendix F.
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a: Cardiovascular/thoracic surgeons experienced perfect retention from 1992-1996.
Table 24 compares specialty-specific pay elasticities from McMahon's 1989 CNA
study with this study. The 1980's were a period of high managed care growth and little
managed care penetration. The 1990's were a period of health care reform, where the
private sector is experiencing high managed care penetration throughout the country. It is
noteworthy to observe the increase in elasticities among primary care physicians.
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Family Practice .07 .09
















General Surgery .45 .46
Cardio/thoracic .71 -.-a
a: Cardiovascular/thoracic surgeons experienced perfect retention from 1992-1996.
Primary care physicians have become more sensitive to pay in the health care
reform environment than they were during the 1980's. With the exception of neuro-
surgery, procedural specialties experienced an increase in sensitivity to pay. Hospital-
based (RAPs) experienced stable results and did not change much over the period of time.
Office based specialties had mixed results.
There are many factors that are important to physicians when they decide whether
to stay in the Navy or seek civilian employment. The gatekeeper role is increasing the
opportunity for primary care physicians to manage patients across the continuum of care,
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as opposed to bypassing a primary care provider and seeking a specialist. Physicians
choose to stay or leave for many reasons, some of which are not quantifiable. Increasing
pay to the median civilian level would substantially increase retention. Paying physicians
at the median civilian level would be extremely expensive and probably be cost-effective.
An increase of $10,000 (20 percent decrease in pay differential) to an average of 700
unobligated physicians each year would cost an estimated $7 million. This amount




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Health care reform and the growth of managed care in the civilian sector have altered
the relative demand for specialty and primary care physicians. Legislation instituted in 1992
by the Health Care Financing Administration placed an increased emphasis on primary care
by modifying fee schedules through the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS).
This primary care is the basic or general health care traditionally provided by family practice,
pediatric, and general internal medicine physicians. Because managed care organizations
employ more generalists and fewer specialists; the labor market for primary care physicians
has become highly competitive. This change in relative demand for physician specialties has
lead to a scarcity of primary care physicians, causing earnings to rise, and an increase in the
ratio of the earnings of primary care to specialists.
The Department of Defense, Health Affairs has responded to this managed care shift
by using the annual Hay Group physician compensation survey in to help determine medical
special pays. Through the use of the annual Hay survey, the Navy has taken the changing
health care environment into account when designing the pay schedules for Navy physicians.
However, preliminary analysis indicates that the current physician pay structure may not
fully reflect the rapidly changing health care environment.
The arrival of health care reform has necessitated an update to a 1989 study
conducted by Joyce McMahon at the Center for Naval Analyses. Her study quantified the
role of the pay differential and concluded that the civilian-military pay differential has a
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significant influence on the probability that a physician leaves the Navy. She found that
increasing pay could be an effective policy tool to increase specialist retention.
This study quantified the role of pay gap on retention using a multivariate logit
retention model, and linked various characteristics of fully trained physicians to the observed
probability of staying in the Navy. The physician personnel data used in this thesis was
gathered from the Defense Manpower Data Center, while physician compensation data was
gathered from the American Association of Medical Colleges and the Hay Group. Two logit
models were estimated, one using AAMC data and the other using Hay Group data.
Civilian physicians experienced higher earnings growth than Navy physicians on
average over this 5-year period, 1992 - 1996. The pay differential increased with experience
level for all specialists and was larger for specialists who required extensive training. In
1988, on average, Navy physician specialists earned 79 percent of what their counterparts
earned in the private sector. In 1 996, Navy physician specialists earned only 66 percent of
what their counterparts earned in the private sector. The Hay data revealed that Navy
physicians earned only 58 percent of their civilian counterparts in 1996. However, specific
specialties such as Anesthesiology, Orthopedics, Emergency Medicine, and Neurology
experienced a closing of the pay gap.
Estimates from the logit retention model using AAMC and Hay Group data showed
that minorities and physicians of a higher rank were associated with a higher probability of
staying in the Navy. Married physicians and scholarship entrants were associated with a
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lower probability of staying in the Navy. The model verified that as the pay gap increases
the probability of staying decreases.
Recent shifts in demand, stemming from health care reform, have resulted in an
increased sensitivity of retention to pay for physicians (using AAMC data) in the 1 990s
compared to the 1980s. The aggregate pay elasticity for the 1980s in the prior CNA study
was .15, while in this study it was .23. Of greater importance, primary care physicians were
more sensitive to pay in recent years. This would be predicted from the growth in managed
care and the growth in civilian earnings opportunities for generalists. The gatekeeper role
has increased the opportunity for primary care physicians to manage patients across the
continuum of care. As this opportunity grew for primary care physicians in the private
sector, the retention rate has dropped among primary care physicians from 80 to 65
percent.
The model using Hay Group physician compensation survey data provides a slightly
different picture of the physician specialist pay elasticity. The aggregate pay elasticity for
specialists was slightly more sensitive than the prior CNA study at .16, but less sensitive than
when we used AAMC data in the model. The very high variation in pay differentials among
specialists may have absorbed the pay gap impact on retention.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
Specialty-specific elasticities can be applied to analyze the expected impact of pay
on retention of representative pay plans. Results ofpay proposals would increase not only
costs, but also retention of physicians by increasing the expected retention probability. The
model would be used to simulate how many physicians will stay who otherwise would have
left. For example, if the Navy eliminated the pay differential for unobligated specialists,
what would be the effect on retention? Would the cost savings from keeping a small number
ofNavy specialists be worth the exorbitant amount of money spent to decrease the pay gap?
A closure of the pay gap to the civilian median would require an average raise of $47,000.
This would cost $32.9 million in annual payments to an average of 700 unobligated
specialists. A current aggregate elasticity of .23 and a 60 percent retention rate yields a
saving of 97 physicians who would stay rather than leave. Under similar circumstances if
the pay differential were reduced by 1 percent, the number of physicians staying (who
would have left) is 10 at a cost of $3.3 million. The goal would be to specifically target
specialty pay to mission critical specialty requirements to alleviate the cost burden of
keeping specialists in the Navy.
After viewing such costs, the decision to "make or buy" comes into focus. The Navy
needs to consider whether they want to spend money to grow physicians or attempt to
purchase fully trained specialists on the market. With the overspecialized civilian physician
force leading to a decrease in relative demand for specialists, the Navy may get specialists
at a competitive price.
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Physicians choose to stay or leave the Navy for many reasons, some of which are not
quantifiable. Factors such as the opportunity to practice in their medical specialty, adequate
support personnel, research opportunities, quality improvement tasks, non-physician health
care, administrative tasks, and miscellaneous quality of life issues are difficult to assess. 1
With inventory shortages in Family Practice, Internal Medicine, and Emergency
Medicine, difficult decisions will be made regarding future Navy wartime demand for such
specialties. Navy medicine will require dynamic leadership to balance the future demands
of physician specialists with limited resources. The implementation of the Total Health
Care Support Readiness Requirement will be a tremendous challenge in an environment of
competing demands. THCSRR will play an ever-increasing role in merging the task of
predicting wartime demands and fulfilling the peace time mission of serving the 700,000
active duty Navy and Marine Corps members and 2.6 million active duty, retired and family
members.
Reductions in the active duty force may reduce the need for Navy physicians. This
will also spur initiatives to reshape the medical corps to better serve the needs of a well-
defined active-duty and beneficiary population. The composition of the force is also
expected to shift away from the surgical specialist, 2 along with the ability to contract for
specialty care from the civilian sector. This changing military environment in conjunction
with the managed care environment of narrowing income differentials between specialists
1 Non-physician health care tasks are those normally performed by a nurse, orderly, or corpsman. Clerks,
receptionists, secretaries, or administrative personnel usually perform non-physician administrative tasks.
2 Ruhnke, 70.
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and primary care physicians, may cause for the Navy to re-evaluate its pay structure and
examine options for the amount, attached obligation, and recipients of medical special pays.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to deal with increasing constrained resources and changing health care
market, the authors recommend using specialty-specific pay elasticities, described earlier,
at the Health Affairs counsel quarterly meetings when determining physician specialty pays.
Pay elasticities quantify the effects of the pay differential on retention. These elasticities will
allow the Quarterly Health Affairs Specialty Council to specifically target mission-critical
specialties based on the probability that a physician will leaves.
The authors further recommend that Health Affairs modify the use of the annual Hay
group survey data by developing a method for representing data for physician specialties by
experience level. The current use of specialty pay comparisons does not account for the
differences in experience based on both seniority and rank. Health Affairs could consider
the use of the AAMC data to provide conservative earnings comparison and to account for
experience level.
Additionally, the users of the Hay Group data may consider accounting for the
surgical specialties of Plastic Surgery, Cardiovascular/thoracic surgery, and Neurosurgery
as separate categories as opposed to combining them into one surgical subspecialty category.
We also recommend separating Cardiology and Gastroenterology, currently combined into
one category, into two categories.
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The authors recommend paying the Multi-Year specialty pay to physicians earlier in
their careers, preferably at the initial obligation point. Retention at the initial obligation
point has been historically low (mid-40 percent in the 1980s). Higher ranking physicians (O-
5's and O-6's) have a high probability of staying with increased pay differentials. If a senior
specialist with 1 5 to 20 years of service will most likely stay, why pay them extra money to
stay? The bonus amount could be targeted instead to younger specialists on the fence to
leave the Navy until they reach that 1 5 to 20 years of service.
One of the goals of this study was to identify the initial obligation decision point for
a fully trained specialist. We feel that the first decision point is particularly important,
because this is when a physician decides whether to make a long-term commitment to the
Navy. For most specialists, the obligated service date (OSD) in BUMIS can be used to
identify the end of initial obligation. However, physicians who undertake more than one
residency (or who are augmented) pose special problems in determining this decision point.
In addition to having database fields for subsequent OSD periods (OSD1, OSD2, OSD3
etc.), we recommend either adding a "yes/no" field for whether a physician is currently in
his initial obligation (updating the field each year). Another option is adding a four-character
field titled "initial obligation" that contains the date of the initial decision point. This would
expedite the time it takes to determine whether a physician is at his first decision point, and
avoid the tedious task of creating a longitudinal database to determine a member's initial
obligation decision point.
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The following are suggestions for further research. First, the Navy should conduct
a cost benefit analysis of the "make or buy" decision in relation to whether the Navy should
grow physician specialists or purchase fully trained specialist physicians "off the shelf from
the civilian health care marketplace. Second, the current House committee decision to phase
out GMO physicians over the next four years should be analyzed. What will that do to the
structure of the Medical corps? Finally, an analysis should be conducted quantifying the
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Pay distributions for AAMC physicians by specialty, 1996
Assistant Associate
Specialty Professor Professor Professor
Emergency Medicine
Sample Size 410 101 44
Mean Income 135,600 151,300 167,600
20th percentile 118,000 132,000 127,000
50th percentile 133,000 149,000 164,000
80th percentile 155,000 173,000 183,000
Anesthesiology
Sample Size 1366 566 284
Mean Income 156,900 191,700 209,800
20th percentile 128,000 160,000 175,000
50th percentile 150,000 184,000 204,000
80th percentile 182,000 217,000 240,000
Dermatology
Sample Size 140 81 80
Mean Income 137,800 187,400 200,900
20th percentile 97,000 110,000 130,000
50th percentile 120,000 164,000 169,000
80th percentile 171,000 226,000 232,000
Family Practice
Sample Size 589 291 96
Mean Income 107,300 123,200 137,600
20th percentile 91,000 103,000 118,000
50th percentile 104,000 120,000 128,000
80th percentile 123,000 140,000 152,000
Neurology
Sample Size 429 285 278
Mean Income 101,100 124,900 159,700
20th percentile 80,000 101,000 128,000
50th percentile 94,000 121,000 148,000
80th percentile 120,000 146,000 179,000
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Pay distributions for AAMC physicians by specialty, 1 996
Assistant Associate
Specialty Professor Professor Professor
Obstetrics and Gynecology
Sample Size 689 379 290
Mean Income 156,400 196,300 218,100
20th percentile 121,000 145,000 160,000
50th percentile 147,000 183,000 200,000
80th percentile 188,000 233,000 255,000
Ophthalmology
Sample Size 258 163 152
Mean Income 156,900 202,200 220,700
20th percentile 112,000 144,000 152,000
50th percentile 138,000 188,000 195,000
80th percentile 184,000 245,000 264,000
Otolaryngology
Sample Size 231 113 81
Mean Income 188,300 221,100 247,600
20th percentile 130,000 165,000 172,000
50th percentile 164,000 200,000 223,000
80th percentile 230,000 270,000 310,000
Pathology
Sample Size 501 436 528
Mean Income 107,700 133,700 160,600
20th percentile 91,000 111,000 133,000
50th percentile 104,000 132,000 157,000
80th percentile 124,000 154,000 193,000
Pediatrics
Sample Size 1819 1108 972
Mean Income 103,100 123,600 146,900
20th percentile 82,000 96,000 118,000
50th percentile 97,000 115,000 138,000
80th percentile 120,000 147,000 170,000
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Pay distributions for AAMC physicians by specialty, 1996
Assistant Associate
Specialty Professor Professor Professor
Preventive Medicine
Sample Size 13 8 12
Mean Income 101,400 119,900 150,800
20th percentile 86,000 94,000 117,000
50th percentile 97,000 104,000 139,000
80th percentile 109,000 156,000 196,000
Psychiatry
Sample Size 771 457 404
Mean Income 101,500 122,700 149,900
20th percentile 84,000 100,000 118,000
50th percentile 99,000 120,000 143,000
80th percentile 119,000 144,000 179,000
Radiology
Sample Size 991 538 602
Mean Income 158,400 195,700 212,300
20th percentile 130,000 161,000 176,000
50th percentile 156,000 195,000 212,000
80th percentile 184,000 225,000 245,000
General Surgery
Sample Size 745 455 532
Mean Income 165,900 225,200 241,500
20th percentile 126,000 155,000 175,000
50th percentile 155,000 202,000 227,000
80th percentile 198,000 280,000 304,000
Neurological Surgery
Sample Size 162 92 102
Mean Income 222,300 302,200 346,000
20th percentile 158,000 200,000 225,000
50th percentile 203,000 269,000 316,000
80th percentile 277,000 392,000 451,000
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Pay distributions for AAMC physicians by specialty, 1996
Assistant Associate
Specialty Professor Professor Professor
Orthopedic
Sample Size 338 176 141
Mean Income 226,900 255,900 274,800
20th percentile 150,000 188,000 190,000
50th percentile 198,000 235,000 244,000
80th percentile 275,000 334,000 346,000
Plastic Surgery
Sample Size 109 52 63
Mean Income 196,600 259,500 287,500
20th percentile 138,000 155,000 200,000
50th percentile 168,000 226,000 263,000
80th percentile 230,000 374,000 369,000
Cardiovascular-Thoracic Surgery
Sample Size 128 91 118
Mean Income 222,300 374,000 433,400
20th percentile 169,000 224,000 213,000
50th percentile 200,000 293,000 362,000
80th percentile 261,000 499,000 600,000
Urology
Sample Size 118 100 124
Mean Income 150,900 220,900 242,400
20th percentile 113,000 165,000 168,000
50th percentile 147,000 211,000 213,000
80th percentile 182,000 280,000 299,000
Gastoenterology
Sample Size 184 104 134
Mean Income 114,600 158,700 169,100
20th percentile 93,000 124,000 133,000
50th percentile 110,000 156,000 164,000
80th percentile 132,000 180,000 196,000
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Pay distributions for AAMC physicians by specialty, 1996
Assistant Associate
Specialty Professor Professor Professor
Cardiology
Sample Size 412 276 330
Mean Income 150,400 177,000 203,000
20th percentile 109,000 126,000 148,000
50th percentile 137,000 165,000 186,000
80th percentile 189,000 214,000 245,000
Internal Medicine
Sample Size 2820 1844 2219
Mean Income 112,300 138,200 165,800
20th percentile 86,000 106,000 126,000
50th percentile 103,000 127,000 155,000




Summary data by specialty

































ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Minimum 60300 88300 102200
1 0th percentile 65500 119600 139600
25th percentile 79200 123400 144800
Median 107800 128900 147000
75th percentile 117000 135300 149700
90th percentile 122600 138600 153100
Maximum 210900 163900 164200
RJV1C percent of mean 46 59 72
Overall mean 115100
Median 119000
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Dermatology
Paygrade
Inventory








Percentage married 86 100 100
Mean annual income 89300 114000 135300
Minimum 65300 103000 120400
1 0th percentile 74300 103600 133000
25th percentile 80300 105700 133600
Median 89700 111500 135700
75th percentile 98100 124200 138900
90th percentile 105100 126700 141100
Maximum 111100 127200 141400
RMC percent of mean 50 62 78
Overall mean 108400
Median 105900
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Family Practice
Paygrade
Inventory












Minimum 62000 83300 83900
1 0th percentile 68500 95600 112600
25th percentile 75500 109100 119700
Median 85900 115000 125900
75th percentile 99400 120200 131100
90th percentile 106100 128000 138400
Maximum 121300 172000 168400
RMC percent of mean 49 61 75
Overall mean 108800
Median 112600
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Neurology













Mean annual income 91000 119100 136200
Minimum 60700 106100 112300
1 0th percentile 65100 107000 112300
25th percentile 79700 113900 129100
Median 95100 118700 139500
75th percentile 104100 125900 141600
90th percentile 110600 130200 153200
Maximum 110800 131200 153200
RMC percent of mean 47 59 75
Overall mean 113200
Median 113900
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Ob/Gyn
Paygrade 04 05 O
Inventory 61 24 15
Number ofMSP takers 7 16 15
Average age 37 46 50
Average LOS 8 10 16
Percentage married 85 83 93
Mean annual income 101900 123700 147300
Minimum 62600 71100 106300
1 Oth percentile 79700 111800 133600
25th percentile 94000 120800 142600
Median 102900 124900 149900
75th percentile 112800 135700 157700
90th percentile 120500 138500 162400
Maximum 133400 150000 165300
RMC percent of mean 43 56 70
Overall mean 114600
Median 113800
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Ophthalmology
Paygrade
Inventory






























ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Minimum 60500 81800 139800
1 0th percentile 62500 88700 139800
25th percentile 70300 116600 143100
Median 92300 127300 148600
75th percentile 109600 136200 152700
90th percentile 119500 137700 156400
Maximum 125500 139100 156400
RMC percent of mean 50 62 80
Overall mean 105400
Median 108400
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Percentage married 92 90 80
Mean annual income 95200 118300 125700
Minimum 63600 91300 98400
10th percentile 66600 96700 110900
25th percentile 88300 112300 118300
Median 99100 118700 127700
75th percentile 105900 124600 134700
90th percentile 109900 131300 139300
Maximum 117600 162000 141400
RMC percent of mean 48 61 70
Overall mean 111700
Median 113800
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Minimum 64100 87300 106900
1 0th percentile 68200 95100 119200
25th percentile 82900 99800 120600
Median 89200 110900 126000
75th percentile 95300 115200 128700
90th percentile 101100 118700 133800
Maximum 109100 130300 160100
RMC percent of mean 50 65 78
Overall mean 106400
Median 107400
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
146





















Mean annual income 88700 111300 126600
Minimum 66200 79500 113000
1 0th percentile 67600 90900 116100
25th percentile 76800 103100 121300
Median 82800 114600 127200
75th percentile 104000 118300 131500
90th percentile 108100 123600 134800
Maximum 112000 133400 140300
RMC percent of mean 49 62 74
Overall mean 111600
Median 116400
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Psychiatry
Paygrade 04 05 06
Inventory 44 32 34
Number ofMSP takers 16 27 32
Average age 39 45 51
Average LOS 9 14 21
Percentage married 82 75 79
Mean annual income 88600 111900 130900
Minimum 65000 82500 105900
10th percentile 70700 99300 119600
25th percentile 78700 109600 124800
Median 87600 115000 129600
75th percentile 99800 120100 135400
90th percentile 105200 122200 138700
Maximum 108000 124300 176900
RMC percent of mean 49 62 79
Overall mean 109000
Median 111700
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Minimum 62600 81900 116000
1 0th percentile 66200 104200 116900
25th percentile 91000 126000 139200
Median 107100 132300 142600
75th percentile 113100 137200 154800
90th percentile 123000 141100 159100
Maximum 161100 143800 169400
RMC percent of mean 46 61 70
Overall mean 114700
Median 115500
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for General Surgery
Paygrade 04 05 06
Inventory 92 46 30
Number ofMSP takers 38 27
Average age 35 47 56
Average LOS 6 13 19
Percentage married 82 91 93
Mean annual income 100600 127700 147500
Minimum 61700 94100 112400
1 Oth percentile 71700 113000 119800
25th percentile 87700 119300 134600
Median 102200 128900 144900
75th percentile 109300 133900 155700
90th percentile 117300 138300 178000
Maximum 187300 184300 231100
RMC percent of mean 43 55 69
Overall mean 117900
Median 116300
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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centage married 84 100 88
an annual income 101500 134500 153800
Minimum 61700 97900 118900
1 Oth percentile 64000 116000 132500
25th percentile 79500 123900 146300
Median 112800 135300 156600
75th percentile 117600 146300 165400
90th percentile 124400 152800 169400
Maximum 143200 154900 172000
70
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Cardiovascular-thoracic Surgery
Paygrade
Inventory






























ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Minimum 63200 74000 135700
1 0th percentile 65900 116500 135700
25th percentile 78200 121900 145700
Median 93500 130100 152100
75th percentile 104700 133500 155200
90th percentile 109100 137500 158300
Maximum 122200 149400 158300
RMC percent of mean 45 62 78
Overall mean 110900
Median 107000
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Minimum 90000 101300 130500
1 0th percentile 90000 117500 130500
25th percentile 92700 119200 135900
Median 99200 121800 136800
75th percentile 106700 131000 139400
90th percentile 107700 133600 142100
Maximum 107700 135200 142100




ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Cardiology
Paygrade
Inventory








Percentage married 100 75 100
Mean annual income 101100 119200 134500
Minimum 66400 114100 114600
1 0th percentile 84600 114100 114600
25th percentile 93100 115300 121500
Median 101100 119400 137700
75th percentile 109800 123000 147600
90th percentile 112300 123800 148100
Maximum 123400 123800 148100
RMC percent of mean 50 62 81
Overall mean 108200
Median 109000
ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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Summary data for Internal Medicine
Paygrade 04 05 06
Inventory





























ns: Not shown due to small number of personnel in cell.
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APPENDIX D
Military Pay comparisons with AAMC and Hay Group data
Military Pay by groupings
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 85,390 94,904 97,748 96,983 106,003 24%
Pediatrics 85,393 95,605 102,514 101,986 104,839 23%
Medicine 82,826 90,210 98,002 96,555 105,846 28%
Ave Primary Care 84,536 93,573 99,421 98,508 105,563 25%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 75,813 84,798 92,752 93,415 97,249 28%
Radiology 93,988 97,533 101,455 101,795 108,487 15%
Anesthesiology 91,845 102,467 106,265 107,569 112,456 22%
Pathology 91,908 99,404 102,361 103,131 109,103 19%
Ave Hospital 88,388 96,051 100,708 101,477 106,824 21%
Office Based
Dermatology 85,505 91,980 100,406 95,977 101,894 19%
Neurology 85,435 96,657 104,227 102,286 111,449 30%
Ob/Gyn 100,541 105,652 106,485 109,176 110,975 10%
Ophthalmology 97,877 102,124 105,332 107,804 115,752 18%
Otolaryngology 87,382 90,080 93,247 96,209 103,489 18%
Prev Med 94,379 100,963 102,830 102,749 110,214 17%
Psychiatry 90,540 99,187 103,701 99,285 106,650 18%
Urology 93,082 98,621 100,451 89,495 101,933 10%
Gastroenterology 88,771 104,783 110,258 111,780 119,588 35%
Cardiology 93,339 96,673 106,081 105,552 108,214 16%
Ave Office 91,685 98,672 103,302 102,031 109,016 19%
Procedure Based
General Surg 94,510 101,960 103,126 107,814 110,381 17%
Neuro Surgery 89,628 92,288 101,400 99,660 98,022 9%
Orthopedic 92,433 104,686 106,548 101,283 111,042 20%
Plastic 107,281 124,440 121,158 133,677 121,892 14%
Cardio/Thoracic 103,131 116,991 122,529 137,140 138,498 34%
Ave Procedure 97,397 108,073 110,952 115,915 115,967 19%
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AAMC Pay data by groupings
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 95,747 102,075 105,568 107,270 121,306 27%
Pediatrics 102,847 105,539 113,477 110,023 123,429 20%
Medicine 111,996 109,736 124,952 123,214 133,773 19%
Ave Primary Care 103,530 105,783 114,665 113,502 126,169 22%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 127,200 125,865 136,330 134,893 142,380 12%
Radiology 154,108 163,852 169,275 166,275 174,062 13%
Anesthesiology 160,093 169,689 171,802 169,459 173,259 8%
Pathology 110,314 109,128 121,109 117,276 129,466 17%
Ave Hospital 137,929 142,133 149,629 146,976 154,792 12%
Office Based
Dermatology 140,077 168,872 147,893 145,173 164,681 18%
Neurology 107,594 113,726 118,994 115,950 125,019 16%
Ob/Gyn 152,112 177,337 172,331 170,614 175,231 15%
Ophthalmology 158,901 162,658 172,966 173,903 187,218 18%
Otolaryngology 163,040 208,528 193,221 184,783 202,497 24%
Prev Med 97,903 108,387 94,712 102,771 126,011 29%
Psychiatry 107,727 113,728 118,725 114,709 122,627 14%
Urology 165,938 184,007 183,270 160,914 180,351 9%
Gastroenterology 111,933 118,000 128,167 129,316 149,036 33%
Cardiology 130,181 139,490 148,934 150,257 161,324 24%
Ave Office 133,541 149,473 147,921 144,839 159,400 19%
Procedure Based
General Surg 170,100 184,727 186,461 183,616 195,637 15%
Neuro Surgery 205,187 227,190 220,586 215,329 254,235 24%
Orthopedic 205,722 226,894 229,656 229,093 239,882 17%
Plastic 212,625 240,567 235,562 224,233 248,633 17%
Cardio/Thoracic 277,077 339,107 347,279 363,373 370,710 34%
Ave Procedure 214,142 243,697 243,909 243,129 261,819 22%
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Pay Differential: AAMC Pay - Military Pay
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 10,357 7,171 7,820 10,287 15,302 48%
Pediatrics 17,454 9,934 10,963 8,037 18,590 7%
Medicine 29,170 19,526 26,950 26,659 27,927 -4%
Ave Primary Care 18,993 12,210 15,244 14,994 20,606 8%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 51,387 41,067 43,578 41,479 45,131 -12%
Radiology 60,120 66,319 67,820 64,479 65,576 9%
Anesthesiology 68,248 67,222 65,536 61,891 60,803 -11%
Pathology 18,406 9,723 18,748 14,145 20,363 11%
Ave Hospital 49,541 46,083 48,921 45,498 47,968 -3%
Office Based
Dermatology 54,572 76,892 47,487 49,195 62,787 15%
Neurology 22,158 17,069 14,767 13,664 13,570 -39%
Ob/Gyn 51,571 71,685 65,846 61,438 64,256 25%
Ophthalmology 61,024 60,534 67,634 66,100 71,466 17%
Otolaryngology 75,658 118,448 99,974 88,574 99,008 31%
Prev Med 3,524 7,424 (8,118) 22 15,798 348%
Psychiatry 17,187 14,540 15,024 15,424 15,977 -7%
Urology 72,856 85,385 82,819 71,419 78,418 8%
Gastroenterology 23,163 13,217 17,908 17,536 29,448 27%
Cardiology 36,842 42,817 42,853 44,704 53,110 44%
Ave Office 41,856 50,801 44,619 42,808 50,384 20%
Procedure Based
General Surg 75,590 82,768 83,335 75,802 85,256 13%
Neurosurgery 115,559 134,903 119,186 115,669 156,213 35%
Orthopedic 113,289 122,208 123,108 127,810 128,840 14%
Plastic 105,344 116,126 114,403 90,556 126,741 20%
Cardio/Thoracic 173,946 222,115 224,750 226,233 232,212 33%
Ave Procedure 116,746 135,624 132,956 127,214 145,853 25%
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Pay Ratio: Military Pay / AAMC Pay
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.87 -2%
Pediatrics 0.83 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.85 2%
Medicine 0.74 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.79 7%
Ave Primary Care 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.84 2%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 0.60 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.68 15%
Radiology 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.62 2%
Anesthesiology 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.65 13%
Pathology 0.83 0.91 0.85 0.88 0.84 1%
Ave Hospital 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.69 8%
Office Based
Dermatology 0.61 0.54 0.68 0.66 0.62 1%
Neurology 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.89 12%
Ob/Gyn 0.66 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.63 -4%
Ophthalmology 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.62 0%
Otolaryngology 0.54 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.51 -5%
Prev Med 0.96 0.93 1.09 1.00 0.87 -9%
Psychiatry 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 3%
Urology 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 1%
Gastroenterology 0.79 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.80 1%
Cardiology 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.67 -6%
Ave Office 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.68 0%
Procedure Based
General Surg 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.56 2%
Neuro Surgery 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.39 -12%
Orthopedic 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.46 3%
Plastic 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.60 0.49 -3%
Cardio/Thoracic 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.37 0%
Ave Procedure 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.44 -3%
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Military Pay by groupings
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 85,390 94,904 97,748 96,983 106,003 24%
Pediatrics 85,393 95,605 102,514 101,986 104,839 23%
Medicine 82,826 90,210 98,002 96,555 105,846 28%
Ave Primary Care 84,536 93,573 99,421 98,508 105,563 25%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 75,813 84,798 92,752 93,415 97,249 28%
Radiology 93,988 97,533 101,455 101,795 108,487 15%
Anesthesiology 91,845 102,467 106,265 107,569 112,456 22%
Pathology 91,908 99,404 102,361 103,131 109,103 19%
Ave Hospital 88,388 96,051 100,708 101,477 106,824 21%
Office Based
Dermatology 85,505 91,980 100,406 95,977 101,894 19%
Neurology 85,435 96,657 104,227 102,286 111,449 30%
Ob/Gyn 100,541 105,652 106,485 109,176 110,975 10%
Ophthalmology 97,877 102,124 105,332 107,804 115,752 18%
Otolaryngology 87,382 90,080 93,247 96,209 103,489 18%
Prev Med 94,379 100,963 102,830 102,749 110,214 17%
Psychiatry 90,540 99,187 103,701 99,285 106,650 18%
Urology 93,082 98,621 100,451 89,495 101,933 10%
Gastroenterology 88,771 104,783 110,258 111,780 119,588 35%
Cardiology 93,339 96,673 106,081 105,552 108,214 16%
Ave Office 91,685 98,672 103,302 102,031 109,016 19%
Procedure Based
General Surg 94,510 101,960 103,126 107,814 110,381 17%
Neuro Surgery 89,628 92,288 101,400 99,660 98,022 9%
Orthopedic 92,433 104,686 106,548 101,283 111,042 20%
Plastic 107,281 124,440 121,158 133,677 121,892 14%
Cardio/Thoracic 103,131 116,991 122,529 137,140 138,498 34%
Ave Procedure 97,397 108,073 110,952 115,915 115,967 19%
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Hay Group data by groupings
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 104,600 112,350 117,400 122,150 128,400 23%
Pediatrics 108,350 115,900 126,800 123,000 133,200 23%
Medicine 112,800 117,550 134,150 129,850 140,600 25%
Ave Primary Care 108,5 83 115,267 126,117 125,000 134,067 23%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 141,100 158,600 176,550 158,150 184,200 31%
Radiology 183,750 198,350 202,000 216,000 227,700 24%
Anesthesiology 176,350 206,950 205,750 201,250 222,800 26%
Pathology 153,550 164,600 166,650 165,850 180,400 17%
Ave Hospital 163,688 182,125 187,738 185,313 203,775 24%
Office Based
Dermatology 149,900 159,550 162,300 153,450 177,800 19%
Neurology 144,450 147,050 153,400 142,050 162,400 12%
Ob/Gyn 179,250 186,800 201,300 204,600 203,000 13%
Ophthalmology 173,550 186,550 186,500 191,550 196,300 13%
Otolaryngology 177,600 188,750 200,950 202,850 210,900 19%
Prev Med 139,050 146,950 142,200 143,300 146,200 5%
Psychiatry 129,400 135,450 141,300 136,800 148,900 15%
Urology 177,300 182,250 200,050 193,550 208,100 17%
Gastroenterolog) ' 145,400 155,800 157,500 154,750 166,800 15%
Cardiology 145,400 155,800 157,500 154,750 166,800 15%
Ave Office 156,130 164,495 170,300 167,765 178,720 14%
Procedure Based
General Surg 169,300 173,350 186,800 191,850 195,000 15%
Neuro Surgery 241,900 274,900 276,950 269,650 298,800 24%
Orthopedic 241,900 132,450 248,950 257,600 271,100 12%
Plastic 241,900 274,900 276,950 269,650 298,800 24%
Cardio/Thoracic 241,900 274,900 276,950 269,650 298,800 24%
Ave Procedure 227,380 226,100 253,320 251,680 272,500 20%
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Pay Differential: Hay Group Pay - Military Pay
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 19,210 17,446 19,652 25,167 22,397 17%
Pediatrics 22,957 20,295 24,286 21,014 28,361 24%
Medicine 29,974 27,340 36,148 33,295 34,754 16%
Ave Primary Care 24,047 21,694 26,696 26,492 28,504 19%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 65,287 73,802 83,798 64,735 86,951 33%
Radiology 89,762 100,817 100,545 114,205 119,213 33%
Anesthesiology 84,505 104,483 99,485 93,681 110,344 31%
Pathology 61,642 65,196 64,289 62,719 71,297 16%
Ave Hospital 75,299 86,074 87,029 83,835 96,951 29%
Office Based
Dermatology 64,395 67,570 61,894 57,473 75,906 18%
Neurology 59,015 50,393 49,173 39,764 50,951 -14%
Ob/Gyn 78,709 81,148 94,815 95,424 92,025 17%
Ophthalmology 75,673 84,426 81,168 83,746 80,548 6%
Otolaryngology 90,218 98,670 107,703 106,641 107,411 19%
Prev Med 44,671 45,987 39,370 40,551 35,986 -19%
Psychiatry 38,860 36,263 37,599 37,515 42,250 9%
Urology 84,218 83,629 99,599 104,055 106,167 26%
Gastroenterology 56,629 51,017 47,242 42,970 47,212 -17%
Cardiology 52,061 59,127 51,419 49,198 58,586 13%
Ave Office 64,445 65,823 66,998 65,734 69,704 8%
Procedure Based
General Surg 74,790 71,390 83,674 84,036 84,619 13%
Neuro Surgery 152,272 182,612 175,550 169,990 200,778 32%
Orthopedic 149,467 27,764 142,402 156,317 160,059 7%
Plastic 134,619 150,460 155,792 135,973 176,908 31%
Cardio/Thoracic 138,769 157,909 154,421 132,510 160,302 16%
Ave Procedure 129,983 118,027 142,368 135,765 156,533 20%
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Pay Ratio: Military Pay / Hay Group Pay
Primary Care 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Percent
Change
Family Practice 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.83 1.1%
Pediatrics 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.79 -0.1%
Medicine 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.75 2.5%
Ave Primary Care 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.79 1.1%
Hospital Based
Emergency Med 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.53 -1.7%
Radiology 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.48 -6.9%
Anesthesiology 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.50 -3.1%
Pathology 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.60 1.0%
Ave Hospital 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.53 -2.5%
Office Based
Dermatology 0.57 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.57 0.5%
Neurology 0.59 0.66 0.68 0.72 0.69 16.0%
Ob/Gyn 0.56 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.55 -2.5%
Ophthalmology 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.59 4.6%
Otolaryngology 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.49 -0.3%
Prev Med 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.75 11.1%
Psychiatry 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 2.4%
Urology 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.49 -6.7%
Gastroenterology 0.61 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.72 17.4%
Cardiology 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.65 1.1%
Ave Office 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 4.7%
Procedure Based
General Surg 0.56 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.57 1.4%
Neuro Surgery 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.33 -11.5%
Orthopedic 0.38 0.79 0.43 0.39 0.41 7.2%
Plastic 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.41 -8.0%
Cardio/Thoracic 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.46 8.7%
Ave Procedure 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.47 0.44 -0.3%
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Elasticities by Specialty for Stayers
Overall
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992-1996
Emergency Medicine 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.14
Anesthesiology 0.26 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.18 0.20
Dermatology 0.14 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.23 0.24
Family Practice 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05
Neurology 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06
Ob/Gyn 0.13 0.50 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.33
Ophthalmology 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.18
Otolaryngology 0.24 0.50 0.58 0.33 0.08 0.31
Pathology 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
Pediatrics 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05
Prev Med 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02
Psychiatry 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.06
Radiology 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.25
General Surg 0.19 0.29 0.40 0.33 0.26 0.27
Neurological Surgery 0.71 0.73 0.56 0.80 0.99 0.79
Orthopedic 0.36 0.50 0.67 0.61 0.33 0.44
Plastic 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.34 0.00 0.22
Cardio/Thoracic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Urology 0.19 0.31 0.44 0.08 0.39 0.26
Gastroenterology 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07
Cardiology 0.19 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.29
Medicine 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.10
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Elasticities by Specialty for Leavers
Overall
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992-1996
Emergency Medicine 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.21
Anesthesiology 0.29 0.37 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.32
Dermatology 0.32 0.46 0.14 0.16 0.34 0.25
Family Practice 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08
Neurology 0.19 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.10
Ob/Gyn 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.23
Ophthalmology 0.31 0.33 0.45 0.37 0.47 0.38
Otolaryngology 0.49 0.46 0.34 0.36 0.75 0.52
Pathology 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.12
Pediatrics 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.09
Prev Med 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.11 0.04
Psychiatry 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11
Radiology 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.21 0.27
General Surg 0.52 0.52 0.34 0.31 0.46 0.46
Neurological Surgery 0.54 0.18 0.56 0.27 0.42 0.37
Orthopedic 0.59 0.44 0.36 0.43 0.71 0.56
Plastic 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.51 0.00 0.82
Cardio/Thoracic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Urology 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.60 0.16 0.39
Gastroenterology 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.12
Cardiology 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.25 0.14
Medicine 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.17
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